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Abstract 
 
 Relative to its importance, little research has been done on the Romano-Parthian 
rivalry that existed during the first two centuries AD.  By extension, even less has been 
written concerning the kingdom of classical Armenia, which often served as the focal 
point of that bitter conflict.  The absence of such research is regrettable, for it was this 
very rivalry that dictated how the Empire’s eastern border would be defined.  According 
to many modern scholars and several of the classical authors, Romans feared the 
looming threat of the Parthian state.  Although such panic was unfounded, this fear 
supposedly then prompted the Empire’s prolonged obsession with the territory of 
Armenia, which both the scholarly and primary sources look upon as a military buffer 
state.  Yet in reality, Roman action in the East was not the result of a collective decision 
of all Roman citizens, but rather brought about by the individual wants and desires of 
Rome’s leaders.  These leaders regarded Armenia not as a buffer state, but as a 
staging ground for their various campaigns against Parthia.  It was their personal 
ambitions, rather than Rome’s collective fear, that drew Armenia under the veil of 
Roman hegemony.  This project intends to examine Armenia’s role in the Romano-
Parthian conflict and hopes to prove that Roman imperialism was not defensive, as 
some scholars assert, but rather the end product of the ambitions of individual Roman 
leaders.         
 
 
 
  1
Introduction 
 
The Roman Republic’s acquisition of the kingdom of Pergamum in 133 BC 
marked the beginning of a long era of military occupation and political interference in 
Asia Minor.1  The Third Mithridatic War (c. 74/73-71) in particular led Roman forces 
beyond Anatolia to the very borders of Armenia.  There, the campaigns of L. Licinius 
Lucullus and Gn. Pompeius Magnus brought Rome into direct conflict with the Armenian 
monarch Tigranes II.  Over the course of the next three centuries, several major 
campaigns and countless smaller expeditions would be conducted in the territory of the 
Upper Euphrates.  Diplomacy and court intrigues would result in the seemingly endless 
rise and fall of Armenian kings, some clients of and others hostile to Rome.  At the 
death of Tigranes in 55 BC, however, Armenia became at best a second rate power in 
the Near East.  Why then, considering the resources expended during such endeavors, 
did the Romans seek so desperately to maintain either military or political control of this 
rather unproductive and often inhospitable territory?   
One theory points to the threat that the Parthian Empire began to pose during the 
latter half of the first century BC.  This explanation proposes that the Romans regarded 
Armenia as a defensive ‘buffer’ state, shielding the more vital imperial provinces of Asia 
Minor and the Near East.2  This fact is not in dispute, for the Romans themselves, as 
the literature will show, did indeed believe this territory to be such a bulwark.  The 
                                                          
1 Strabo 13.4.2. 
2 For references to Armenia as a ‘buffer’ state see Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the 
Roman Empire (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 24; and Adrian N. 
Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East: 168 BC-AD 1 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), 
337; For references to Rome’s defensive policies see Theodor Mommsen, The History of Rome Vol. II, 
Trans. by William Dickson (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903), 520-22 et passim; and Tenney 
Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1925), 8-9 et passim.  
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biographer Suetonius criticized the Emperor Tiberius for allowing “the Parthians to 
overrun Armenia – a negligence as dangerous to the Empire as it was dishonorable.”3  
It should be, though, no surprise that the perceptions of the Roman authors and reality 
did not necessarily coincide.  Such a theory depicts Rome as being on the defensive, 
resisting the constant assaults of an aggressive Parthia.  Regardless of what the 
ancient writers assert, however, this was simply not the case.  
Roman generals, who led armies into Armenia following the campaigns of 
Lucullus and Pompey, were, in fact, doing so in order to obtain glory and plunder, not 
from that territory, but from its fierce and wealthy neighbor Parthia.  The Third 
Mithridatic War did, indeed, have repercussions far beyond anything that the Romans 
had originally intended.  It introduced them to the opportunities and wonders available 
from the Middle and Far East.  The Parthian Empire, which bestrode several famous 
trade routes to India and China, flourished during the centuries in question by becoming 
the middleman of the classical world.  Thus, it is understandable why it also became the 
object of so many Romans’ ambitions.4   
Armenia was, in fact, therefore a defensive ‘buffer’ zone, though not for the 
Romans.  For when we examine in detail the military and political history of this territory, 
as this paper intends to do, it is not the Roman Empire that appears on the defensive.  
Regardless of what the sources, which are predominately Roman, suggest, few 
Parthian armies ever mobilized that seriously endangered the imperial provinces.  It was 
rather Rome’s perpetual interference in Armenian and sometimes Parthian politics that 
continually threatened the stability of the region.  The territory of Armenia must, 
                                                          
3 Sue. Tib. 41. 
4 M. P. Charlesworth, Trade-Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1924), 58. 
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therefore, be viewed less as a ‘buffer’ state and more as a staging ground.  The Roman 
Empire must be regarded, not as a noble defender of its provinces and allies, but as a 
relentless aggressor, bent on expansion. 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to reshape modern views of ancient 
Armenia.  It will examine in detail the eastern campaigns and policies of Rome’s 
generals and emperors.  Although its scope will span nearly three centuries, 70 BC – 
AD 220, it intends to show an overall pattern of Roman belligerence and militancy.  Still, 
this pattern should not be mistaken for an overarching strategy.  Despite some 
historians’ attempts to prove otherwise, Roman expansion in the East proceeded on a 
case by case basis.  The fires of Roman aggression were thus stoked not according to 
some grand master plan, but according to the personal wants and desires of prominent 
Roman figures like Pompey, Caesar Augustus, and Trajan.  Their private lusts for glory 
and plunder sustained Rome’s preoccupation with Armenia, not for its own sake, but for 
the sake of what lay beyond.  Parthia was, for many Romans, the greatest prize – and 
Armenia, but a steppingstone.   
  
  4
Chapter 1 
Origins of the Romano-Parthian Conflict 
 
By 70 BC, the Third Mithridatic War between the Roman Republic and the 
Kingdom of Pontus was winding to an indefinite conclusion.  Despite having routed the 
army of the Pontic king Mithridates IV Eupator, the Roman general L. Licinius Lucullus 
had been unable to capture the king himself, who had fled eastward seeking protection 
at the court of his son-in-law Tigranes II the Great of Armenia.  Lucullus was prevented 
from an immediate pursuit by prolonged sieges at Sinope and Amisus and tribal 
uprisings of the Chaldaei and Tibareni.  Although Pontus was now firmly under Roman 
control, the escape of Mithridates must have made any such victory seem hollow and 
unfulfilling.5   
The Pontic king had, for nearly thirty years, been the undoing of Rome’s policies 
concerning its Asian provinces.  Besides being a constant threat to the Roman client 
kingdoms of Bithynia and Cappadocia, his diplomatic maneuverings and military 
incursions had already drawn Rome into two previous wars.  If Lucullus was to accept a 
triumph for his successes in Asia, such a display had to include the vanquished, broken 
figure of Mithridates himself.  Only then would Rome know that the power of Pontus had 
been checked once and for all.6  
To secure the king’s person, Lucullus sent his legate Appius Claudius to 
Armenia.  Tigranes the Great was, however, unable or perhaps unwilling to hold a 
timely audience with the Roman emissary.  Only after a lengthy journey throughout the 
territory was Appius finally received by Tigranes at Antioch, at which meeting the rather 
                                                          
5 Plut. Luc. 19, 23; App. Mithr. 83; and Sherwin-White Roman Policy 171-73.  
6 Sherwin-White Roman Policy 171-73.  
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cavalier demands of the Romans were presented.  Appius ordered Tigranes either to 
produce his father-in-law Mithridates or to expect a declaration of war from the Romans.  
It is unknown whether or not such a lack of diplomacy reflected Lucullus’ true position or 
merely that of an agitated, travel-weary Appius.  Left no room for proper negotiation or 
compromise, however, Tigranes had no choice but to deny the Romans their prize.  
Thus in 69, Lucullus launched the first Roman invasion of Armenia.7   
Such a story is noteworthy not only because it marks a turning point in the history 
of Rome’s eastern expansion, but also because it provides crucial insight into the 
motivations behind those ambitions.  Most ancient authors propose that Roman 
expansion was ‘defensive.’  In Cicero’s De re publica, the younger C. Laelius boasts, 
“Our people has now gained power over the whole world by defending its allies.”8  In 
similar vein, Polybius implies that all the Romans wanted was to protect themselves 
from their ‘frightening neighbors.’9  Rome did, indeed, in some cases see itself as being 
offended or even assaulted by those peoples on its borders.  The sources attest as 
much.  Yet, although diplomatic affronts and hostilities warranted a military response in 
some instances, in others they certainly did not.  Such insults sometimes merely 
provided a necessary pretext for Roman aggression.  Appius’ confrontation with 
Tigranes, which will be discussed later in greater detail, demonstrates that these 
‘incidents’ could be easily manufactured.  What then were the real motivations for this 
expansion and from where did they derive?   
This very question has served as the basis for much recent scholarship.  Great 
effort has been made to disprove notions of ‘defensive’ imperialism.  Chapter 1 will 
                                                          
7 Plut. Luc. 21; App. Mithr. 83.  
8 Cic. Rep. 3.23.   
9 Polyb. 1.10. 
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review this modern literature and then attempt to elicit the true motivations behind 
Roman expansion.  It will also be necessary to examine the Armenian and Parthian 
campaigns of Lucullus, Pompey, Crassus, and Mark Antony.  Their eastern expeditions 
laid the groundwork for Rome’s future relationship with Parthia and established 
precedents that would be carried well into the third century AD. 
Review of Literature 
Scant research has been done specifically on the territory of classical Armenia.  
Scholars more often choose to incorporate its history into broader works concerning 
Rome’s eastern provinces and affairs.  This topic is also made more difficult by the fact 
that the literary evidence which has survived concerning Armenia is disseminated 
throughout such a wide range of primary source materials.  Thus, this project must first 
credit several texts which have proved invaluable for both their critical insight and 
guidance through such a complicated topic.  These works include: Adrian N. Sherwin-
White’s Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 BC-AD 1, Neilson C. Debevoise’s A 
Political History of Parthia, and F. A. Lepper’s Trajan’s Parthian War.  However, despite 
their usefulness, these texts are but merely the most recent interpretation of an 
argument which has spanned nearly a century.10          
Debates among historians concerning Roman expansion and notions of 
defensive imperialism first arose at the end of the nineteenth century.  Interest in this 
topic, no doubt, stemmed from contemporary efforts to explain or perhaps justify 
modern European colonialism.  Theodor Mommsen and Tenney Frank are the best 
known authors of Roman defensive theory.  Based both on literary evidence, such as 
                                                          
10 Sherwin-White Roman Policy; Neilson C. Debevoise, A Political History of Parthia (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1938); and F. A. Lepper, Trajan’s Parthian War (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1948).  
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those aforementioned quotations from Cicero and Polybius, and on other textual 
references to longstanding Roman traditions, such as the fetial ceremony, this theory 
suggests that Rome’s expansion was the result of its natural response to outside 
aggression.  So persuasive were Mommsen and Frank that such thinking has 
dominated the field of Roman history for much of the twentieth century.11     
 Only in recent decades have historians begun to question and reevaluate these 
ideas.  William V. Harris’ War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327- 70 BC seeks 
to refute defensive imperialism by emphasizing Rome’s obvious other motivations for 
expanding.  Besides various economic incentives, Rome’s generals and emperors 
longed for any opportunity to further their quests for glory and honor.  Harris proposes, 
therefore, that Roman expansion was not the latent result of defensive measures, but 
rather the aftereffect of a conscious effort to acquire wealth and prestige.12   
Other scholars have attempted to attribute an over-arching strategy to the growth 
of the Roman state in order to show that its progression was not random or haphazard 
as defensive theory asserts.  The groundbreaking work that first put forth this idea was 
Edward Luttwak’s The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire.  In it, Luttwak argues that 
the development of the Roman frontier can be divided into three distinct phases: an 
early period of client states under the Julio-Claudians, an era of ‘scientific’ or preclusive 
borders founded by the Flavians and Antonines, and finally a defense-in-depth strategy 
adopted during the crises of the third century.13   
Although initially persuasive, there are problems with this theory.  The two most 
recent attempts to refute or to revise Luttwak’s thesis have been Benjamin Isaac’s The 
                                                          
11 Mommsen History of Rome 520-22; Frank Roman Imperialism 8-9.  
12 William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979), 54-67, 105-130. 
13 Luttwak Grand Strategy 1-7. 
  8
Limits of Empire and Susan P. Mattern’s Rome and the Enemy.  One glaring criticism of 
Luttwak is that his theory is too generalized.  If, in fact, there was a Roman strategy, 
how could that single strategy be applied to an empire so large and diverse?  Isaac’s 
work thus focuses specifically on Rome’s Asian and Near Eastern frontiers.  He differs 
from Luttwak by asserting that there were no definitive borders in the east.  He suggests 
rather that “the political boundary of the empire was irrelevant as a concept, and the 
military boundary was never organized as a ‘line of defense’.”14  The function of Roman 
legions stationed in Asia Minor, Syria, and Judea, according to Isaac, was to serve as a 
police force.  The local Roman magistrates relied on the army not only to quell potential 
rebellions, but also to enforce the collection of tribute.  Therefore, these legions were 
garrisoned in towns and cities, where they might be more effective for these purposes, 
and not on some remote frontier along an imaginary line in the sand.15 
Critics of Luttwak also argue that the Romans may have even been incapable of 
thinking in terms of geographical or political borders.  Mattern points out that Romans 
formulated most of their perceptions of other peoples through ethnographic literature.  
They spoke of their enemies in terms of tribes and kings, and not as states or kingdoms.  
A Roman map, known as an itinerarium pictum or a periplus, usually depicted at best a 
crude representation of the Mediterranean basin.  Armies or merchants typically 
compiled these itineraries to record distances between cities.  Mattern suggests that the 
Romans, hampered by such inaccurate tools, were unable to clearly define their borders 
or to contrive any workable strategies.16   
                                                          
14 Benjamin Isaac, The Limits of Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 3. 
15 Ibid. 3-5, 43-45, 385-86. 
16 Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 1-3, 
21-23, 24-26, 42-43. 
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This paper sides with Isaac and Mattern in rejecting Luttwak’s theory of a grand 
strategy.  However, it also dismisses notions of ‘defensive’ imperialism, agreeing with 
Harris and others.  Generals and emperors who acted in the East did so on an ad hoc 
basis, and not in accordance with some master plan.  Rome’s eastern commanders 
were often given free rein concerning frontier policy.  Left to their own devices, they 
pursued the two things dictated most important by their culture, wealth and glory.  It 
would be prudent here to examine these particular motivations in greater detail.   
Luxuria et Avaritia 
Despite its staunchly conservative values of stoicism and military preparedness, 
Roman society was not shy about its growing affluence.  This fact is evident from the 
fervent reactions of such noted moralists as Cato the Elder, who advocated a return to 
traditional Roman values.  Although Cato himself approved of expansion, he feared that 
the constant influx of wealth would make his countrymen soft and ill prepared to deal 
with their enemies.  He had witnessed firsthand the luxuria and avaritia brought about 
by the Punic Wars and loathed the ostentation and sumptuousness in which the 
Romans reveled.17   
 Still, Cato’s warnings went unheeded by most Romans who looked upon 
expansion as a vast untapped enterprise.  For warfare in the ancient world, as long as 
one was victorious, benefited nearly all levels of a society.  Officers and common 
soldiers that made up the conquering army naturally received a portion of the booty.  
Yet, a vast amount of the gold and silver plundered was also reserved for the state.  
The transport of this bullion, in addition to captives and slaves, was delegated to 
merchants, whose class also produced and distributed military supplies.  Resident 
                                                          
17 Livy 34.2-4. 
  10
Romans, especially members of the equestrian class, living among conquered peoples 
also grew wealthy as moneylenders, tax-farmers, and slave-traders.  Romans must, 
therefore, have seen expansion and the accumulation of wealth as being inextricably 
connected.18 
 Treasure stores and slaves were not, furthermore, the only things of value to be 
gained from warfare.  Since the late first century BC, Rome had been in indirect contact 
with Far Eastern states in India and China.  These contacts developed eventually into 
extensive trading networks; and, by the first century AD, Rome was, indeed, engaged in 
costly trade with the Far East.  Pliny the Elder lamented: “And by the lowest reckoning 
India, China, and the Arabian peninsula take from our empire 100 million sesterces 
every year – that is the sum which our luxuries and our women cost us; for what fraction 
of these imports, I ask you, now goes to the gods or to the powers of the lower world?”19  
The emperor Tiberius too noted this growing trend when he complained of “the feminine 
specialty – the export of our currency to foreign or enemy countries for precious 
stones.”20  Hoards of early Roman coinage have been discovered in southern India 
where pearls and spices were sold to western traders.  The anonymous Periplus Maris 
Erythraei provides lists of the many goods transported across the Indian Ocean to the 
covetous markets of the Roman Empire.  Such lists included not only gems and spices, 
but also silks, ivory, tortoise shells, and slaves.21 
Any hindrance posed to this trade by Parthia and other rival states must have 
influenced Roman policy concerning its eastern boundary.  Interference there 
                                                          
18 William V. Harris War and Imperialism 56; Sherwin-White Roman Policy 15-17; and Tenney 
Frank, “Mercantilism and Rome’s Foreign Policy,” American Historical Review 18 (1912-13): 249-52.  
19 Plin. HN 12.84. 
20 Tac. Ann. 3.52. 
21 Charlesworth Trade-Routes 58-63; Periplus Maris Erythraei (Princeton: Lionel Casson, 1989), 
39-43. 
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threatened not only the supply of luxury goods, but also the very livelihood of the 
Roman aristocracy – the class that not only dictated, but also carried out Rome’s 
international policies.  To support its sumptuous lifestyle, the senatorial class, which had 
long relied on its large landed estates, also became involved in maritime trade.  The 
Roman elite had, therefore, a vested interest in eastern affairs.  From his research on 
Roman foreign relations during the Republican Period, Harris concludes that the Senate 
annexed territory whenever “it was possible and profitable to do so.”22 
The Roman aristocracy was, thus, conscious of the economic benefits of warfare 
and did not hesitate when given the opportunity to expand both its borders and its 
fortunes.  But was this pursuit of wealth the sole driving force behind the imperial war 
machine?  To think so does seem premature, for in the funeral eulogy of L. Caecilius 
Metellus “acquiring great wealth” is deemed only acceptable when done so “by good 
means.”23  It would seem then that there was both a right and a wrong way to pursue 
one’s fortune, and that Roman values were not strictly defined by economics alone.  
Roman morality did have its part to play in the saga of imperial expansion.  It is to this 
topic that we now turn.   
Gens et Patria 
The Roman moral code demanded strict allegiance to both one’s family and 
fatherland.  Every Roman aristocrat did, after all, owe his privileged status to these two 
institutions.  Bringing honor to one’s household and glory to the state were considered 
the greatest of Roman virtues.  One could achieve such praise not only by succeeding 
in business ventures, but also by winning political elections and securing military 
                                                          
22 Livy 21.63; Harris War and Imperialism 105-7. 
23 Plin. HN 7.140. 
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appointments.  Dedication to the gens and patria was ingrained in the Roman psyche.  
It defined who the Romans were; it motivated them to excel. 
 Roman gentes, or clans, cooperated and negotiated with each other by means of 
complicated marriage alliances.  Securing a propitious union for one’s son or daughter 
could result in lucrative business opportunities or useful political connections.  Opulent 
dowries also accompanied the most favorable brides.  But such prizes were not easily 
won by a gens without power and prestige of its own.  Thus, young Romans, whether in 
politics or in the military, were encouraged to seek public renown, for with fame came 
honor and often the best offers of marriage.  In a letter describing a suitable husband for 
the niece of his friend Junius Mauricus, Pliny spends most of the correspondence 
praising the political accomplishments of the potential bridegroom’s uncle, Publius 
Acilius, who “passed with the greatest credit through the offices of quaestor, tribune, 
and praetor.”24    
 A successful political or military career benefited not only one’s living relatives, 
but also one’s descendents.  Roman honor was passed from one generation to the 
next.  Having even a distant ancestor who was once made consul or commander of a 
legion could increase a family’s prestige.  The greatest of the gentes traced their lineage 
to the very heroes of Rome’s early history.  Romans paid homage to these forebears by 
displaying images of each household’s most distinguished ancestors.   
 However, the reliance on ancestry as the defining mark of one’s nobility and 
class did not lead to lethargy among the elite.  Immense pressure was placed on 
Roman youths to equal or to surpass the accomplishments of their forefathers.  In a 
well-known story depicting proper Roman matronhood, the adolescent grandsons of 
                                                          
24 Plin. Ep. 1.14.  
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Scipio Africanus, the acclaimed hero of the Second Punic War, are berated by their 
mother Cornelia for not yet having become as famous as their grandfather.25  Behind 
the drive for imperial expansion is this very notion of one-upmanship.  Rome’s generals 
and emperors sought to honor their gentes by winning more battles, conquering more 
territory, and plundering more treasure stores than any other Roman had before them.   
 In addition to honoring the gens, the successful expansion of the Empire also 
signified the triumph of the patria and of Roman ideals.  Many Romans reveled in the 
idea that they were somehow superior to those peoples that they had conquered, and 
that this superiority justified Roman hegemony over the entire world.  Numerous 
references to the fines imperii are found in public prayers, official prophecies, and 
honorary inscriptions.26  One such inscription, commissioned by Pompey in 61, claims 
that he had extended the imperial frontiers to the ends of the earth.27  In his speeches 
against the conspirator Catiline, Cicero declares, “Our empire ends not in any region of 
the earth but in the heavens.”28 
 The very cultural atmosphere of Rome seems then to have promoted expansion.  
This fact should not be surprising considering the warlike character of the Roman 
people.  They did, after all, entertain themselves with the blood sports of gladiatorial 
shows and chariot races.  But to say that imperial expansion was merely the result of 
some sort of bloodlust would be too simplified.  Roman honor was based on a complex 
relationship between the individual, the gens, and the patria.  By winning praise in the 
Senate or on the battlefield, a Roman brought honor not only to himself, but also to his 
family and fatherland.  Both Harris and Sherwin-White agree that, although economic 
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factors did play their part in extending the frontiers, it was this insatiable pursuit of honor 
and glory that actually drove Roman expansion.  It would be useful here to discuss 
several of the Late Republican generals who best exemplify such ambitions.29   
Lucius Licinius Lucullus 
It was perhaps Rome’s conflicted policies towards its new Asian province that 
allowed Mithridates Eupator his initial victories.  Beginning in 91, the Pontic king 
shrewdly annexed Bithynia and Cappadocia with little or no Roman reprisal.  His armies 
then proceeded into western Anatolia, all the while slaughtering resident Romans and 
Italians.  These massacres resulted in the First Mithridatic War (89-85), during which 
Pontic forces reached as far as Athens before being halted by L. Cornelius Sulla’s five 
legions.  Mithridates surrendered at Dardanus and was permitted to return to Pontus.  
The Second Mithridatic War (c. 83-81) pitted the Pontic king against Sulla’s lieutenant L. 
Licinius Murena.  However, this conflict was confined to raids and border skirmishes 
and was soon abandoned by both sides.  Then in 76/75, Nicomedes IV of Bithynia died 
suddenly and, as Attalus of Pergamum had done, left his kingdom to the Roman people.  
Mithridates again mobilized for war.  At the same time, several factions in Rome were 
pushing to renew hostilities with Pontus.  The Third Mithridatic War initiated by Pontus’ 
invasion of Bithynia in 74/73, may thus be regarded as a preemptive strike.  Mithridates 
was well aware that, however haphazard it might seem, left unchecked, Roman 
expansion would eventually threaten his own kingdom.30   
In 74, both Roman consuls were dispatched to Asia to prepare for the coming 
war with Mithridates, although only one, M. Cotta, had originally been selected for this 
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purpose.  The other consul, L. Lucullus, who had been allotted Cisalpine Gaul, 
conspired with his co-consul to secure instead the Asian province of Cilicia.  Both men 
undoubtedly knew that an eastern war would provide them with more opportunities for 
glory and plunder than any pacified western province ever could.  This is not to say, 
however, that there were not other conflicts elsewhere.  Besides the looming problems 
in Asia, to which four legions had already been delegated, the empire also had to 
contend with tribal revolts in Macedon, rampant piracy throughout the Mediterranean, 
and civil war in Hispania.  The difference is that these other troubled regions essentially 
required police actions and did not provide the same opportunities for prestige.  
Resolving civil or tribal disputes could not nearly match saving the state from 
Mithridates, whom most Romans regarded as a despotic megalomaniac.31   
The first phase of the war commenced, as mentioned, in 74/73 with Mithridates’ 
invasion of Bithynia.  At Chalcedon, the Pontic king confronted Cotta, whom he quickly 
defeated.  He then laid siege to the port city of Cyzicus, hoping to establish naval supply 
shipments via the Black Sea from his other holdings in Colchis and the Crimea.  
Lucullus, arriving too late to assist his co-consul at Chalcedon, encircled Mithridates’ 
army and began a counter-siege.  The Romans avoided a pitched battle, while 
incessantly harrying their foe’s overland supply lines.  Unable to immediately take 
Cyzicus, the Pontic forces were eventually beset by hunger and disease.  That winter, 
Mithridates withdrew to Pontus with but a fraction of his original army.32   
Following Mithridates’ retreat, several Roman proconsuls met at Nicomedia to 
discuss their strategy.  Although the conservative element at this meeting favored a 
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diplomatic end to the war, Lucullus and his associates insisted on pursuing Mithridates.  
Perhaps Lucullus felt that he had not attained the glory he duly deserved because there 
had been no definitive battle.33   
In the summer of 71, Lucullus launched his Pontic campaign with the intention of 
capturing Mithridates and ending Rome’s troubles in Asia.  However, the second phase 
of the war proceeded very much as the first had.  Lucullus maneuvered swiftly through 
Pontus attacking communication lines and besieging cities.  Mithridates, seeing that he 
had already lost the advantage, decided to fall back even further into Lesser Armenia.  
Although the sources concerning this episode are vague, it seems that, at some point, 
Mithridates’ army broke down, and what had begun as a withdrawal turned quickly into 
a rout.  Mithridates and his companions abandoned the field and escaped to Armenia.  
With their enemy’s army in such chaos, the Romans moved in to disperse the remnants 
and thus, without a single battle, took control of Pontus.  Despite his victory, Lucullus 
was, most likely, disheartened by these events, for he had lost Mithridates not once, but 
twice.34  
Lucullus’ disappointment most probably prompted not only Appius’ mission to 
Tigranes, but also the harsh terms that were presented to the Armenian monarch.  
There is no reason to suspect that Tigranes, once allowed some opportunity to save 
face, would not have handed over Mithridates.  They were, of course, in-laws; however, 
most of the Asian kingdoms were then connected in some way by marriage.  Family ties 
did not necessarily always assure political alignment, especially with the threat of 
Roman aggression looming overhead.  The sources emphasize, furthermore, that 
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during the preceding war Tigranes remained neutral and lent no aid whatsoever to his 
father-in-law.  The Armenian monarch had been otherwise occupied consolidating the 
northern Mesopotamian territories of Gordyene, Sordene, and Adiabene, which he had 
recently captured from the Parthian Empire.  An extended conflict with the Romans was 
the last thing that he needed or desired.35   
Nor may we blame Lucullus’ Armenian invasion simply on the careless arrogance 
of the legate Appius.  Even if his subordinate had demonstrated poor judgement, 
Lucullus was not completely bound by this mistake, for he had, if he wanted, an ‘out’ 
available to him.  He had been given no authority to declare war on Tigranes.  Any 
punitive expedition that would proceed would do so without the approval of the Roman 
Senate.  It seems unlikely, therefore, that Lucullus would have risked all merely to 
uphold the word of a rash young officer.  If he had not wished to make good on Appius’ 
threat, he had but to point to Roman law, losing no honor in doing so.  
Therefore, it may be assumed that the impetus for this conflict lay with the 
appetites of Lucullus himself.  Besides the obvious prestige of being the first Roman 
general to march beyond the Taurus and Euphrates, Lucullus may also have been 
tempted by the unimaginable wealth that awaited any conqueror in the numerous 
storehouses of the Armenian king.  Tigranes the Great, until the age of forty, had lived 
as a hostage at the Parthian court of the Arsacid ruler Mithridates II Megas.  Being a full 
descendant of the Artaxiad dynasty, he was, however, later ransomed (c. 95 BC) in 
order that he might assume the Armenian throne.  Although he continued to serve as a 
vassal of Mithridates II until that king’s death in 88, he eventually became the most 
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powerful monarch in the Near East, and ruled the only significant empire the Armenians 
would know in the ancient world.  Internal disputes among the Parthian nobility allowed 
Tigranes to seize first the aforementioned Mesopotamian territories.  Soon thereafter, 
he also overran Commagene, Cilicia, and Syria.  His unrivaled success and boldness 
led even to his adoption of the old Persian title ‘King of Kings.’  A victory for Lucullus 
over Tigranes would be, therefore, no small thing, even if we ignore the potential 
prominence he could attain by also capturing Mithridates Eupator.36 
The Armenian campaign, which began in 69, was the first instance in which 
Roman forces marched onto the Tigris plateau in southern Armenia.  Once there, 
Lucullus wasted no time advancing on Tigranes’ capital of Tigranocerta.  Unlike the 
previous war, however, he was met in battle by a sizable force commanded by both 
Tigranes and Mithridates.  Although outnumbered, the Romans managed to turn back 
the great, oriental army.  Yet once again, Mithridates eluded capture, and fled with 
Tigranes into the mountains of northern Armenia.  Perhaps out of disgust, Lucullus then 
proceeded systematically to dismember the very empire of the Armenian king.  He first 
ordered Tigranocerta completely dismantled and freed the various peoples Tigranes 
had enslaved there.  He also liberated several northern Mesopotamian territories from 
Armenian rule.  This last action was, in itself, significant, for doing so marked the first 
case in which the Romans involved themselves in the politics of Parthia.  Prior to 
Tigranes’ occupation, these territories had been vassal states of the Parthian king.  
Fortunately for Lucullus, Parthia was then in no condition to oppose him.37   
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The Parthians’ reluctance to confront the Romans did not prevent them from 
receiving Tigranes’ envoys.  This embassy may have even offered the Parthian king 
Phraates III the Mesopotamian territories in question in exchange for an alliance against 
the Romans.  However, the certainty of this allegation may never be known because 
upon hearing of these negotiations Lucullus sent his own ambassadors to Phraates.  
Following the arrival of the Roman legates, Parthia assumed a ‘watchful neutrality.’38   
Most of the sources confirm this series of events, with the exception of Plutarch.  
In his retelling, Lucullus foregoes all diplomatic channels and instead plans an outright 
attack on the Parthians.  Plutarch cites Lucullus’ desire for glory as the reason for his 
pugnacity.  Yet this attack never occurred because his troops refused to venture any 
further into unknown territory.  But should we lend any credence at all to this version?  
Sherwin-White does not.  He argues that Lucullus would never have intentionally 
marched on Parthia, which would have left Tigranes and Mithridates at his rear.39   
Although this essay too rejects Plutarch’s rendering of events, it does so on 
wholly different grounds.  Lucullus had already bested Tigranes’ great army and put 
Mithridates to flight on three separate occasions.  He, therefore, had no reason to fear, 
or even to suspect, that they would pose any immediate trouble.  Plutarch’s recounting 
too coincides more closely with descriptions of Lucullus’ character.  Sallust, although 
critical of Lucullus, notes, “He was thought outstanding in every way, except for his 
extreme desire for extending the empire.”40  Plutarch’s interpretation is dubious 
because, of the four ancient authors who deal with this subject matter, his is the only 
one in which Lucullus does not attempt to resolve the situation diplomatically.  Still, 
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although Plutarch’s account might not accurately reflect the chain of events, it provides 
us with some insight into Lucullus’ personality and motivations.  It is not inconceivable 
that Plutarch, in confusing the details, might have fashioned the story around the man.  
Apart from this episode, however, there is little doubt as to the events that 
followed Lucullus’ victory at Tigranocerta.  After resolving the Parthian question, the 
Roman army turned again to northern Armenia and Tigranes’ second capital of 
Artaxata.  Lucullus sought to capture Tigranes and Mithridates themselves, perhaps for 
some future triumph he imagined himself receiving.  Yet the mountainous terrain of the 
region and the guerrilla tactics of the enemy proved too difficult for the Romans.  Unable 
to reach Artaxata, Lucullus withdrew to southern Armenia where he besieged and took 
Nisibis.  While the Romans wintered there, Mithridates managed to raise a small army 
of his own and marched back to Pontus.  He surprised the local Roman commanders 
who, like Lucullus, may have never expected to see the Pontic king again.  Mithridates 
capitalized on this advantage and, at Zela, slaughtered the equivalent of two and a half 
Roman legions.  He then fell back to the citadel of Talaura in Lesser Armenia to await 
Median reinforcements led by Tigranes.  Upon hearing the news of this bloodbath, 
Lucullus broke camp and prepared to advance against Mithridates.  This time, however, 
his troops balked.  Refusing to proceed as Lucullus commanded, the officers agreed 
instead to withdraw to Galatia where they assumed a defensive position.  Unhindered, 
Mithridates ventured forth from Talaura and retook Pontus.  The Roman Senate, which 
had not previously interfered, voted to recall Lucullus.  His replacement, the famous Gn. 
Pompey, was appointed the following year to led Rome’s eastern armies.41 
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Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus 
In 66 BC, Gn. Pompey was commissioned with the task of subduing both Pontus 
and Armenia once and for all.  He first assembled troops from the various Anatolian 
provinces and combined them with the remnants of Lucullus’ army.  Therefore, his 
campaign force may have numbered some forty-five thousand at the outset.  
Mithridates, who had yet to recover fully from his previous confrontation with Rome, 
most likely, was able to muster no more than thirty thousand infantry and two or three 
thousand cavalry.  Although the sources are unclear, the final battle between these two 
armies seems to have taken place in the upper Lycus valley near Nicopolis.  The ease 
with which Pompey’s legionaries routed Mithridates’ hastily built army demonstrates the 
superiority Rome exercised in Asia at this time.  Despite this military supremacy, 
Pompey was, as Lucullus had been, unable to capture the elusive Mithridates himself, 
who fled once again eastward into Lesser Armenia.42   
 After securing his rear, Pompey rallied his troops, supposedly to pursue the 
Pontic king.  Ignoring rumors of Mithridates’ presence in Colchis, he proceeded instead 
directly to Artaxata.  Tigranes, who was then still residing there, rode out to meet the 
Roman army as it approached and surrendered in ceremonial fashion to Pompey.  
Lucullus’ policies and subsequent withdrawal from southern Armenia the previous year 
had created a void of power in that region.  Tigranes had been unable to reassert his 
influence there and was forced, consequently, to defer to the Parthian monarch 
Phraates.  Thus pressured on all sides, Tigranes felt that the most prudent act was to 
ally himself with Rome.  His gamble succeeded because Pompey, although stripping 
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him of most of his provinces, allowed him to retain his throne, and thereby become 
Rome’s first Armenian client-king.43 
 As an incentive for his loyalty, Pompey turned over to Tigranes the northern 
Mesopotamian territory of Gordyene.  Unbeknownst to the Armenians, however, 
Pompey had entered into earlier negotiations with Phraates, promising him that same 
province.  To worsen matters even further, the Parthian army had wasted no time in 
occupying it.  Upon learning of the Romans’ sudden reversal, Phraates issued an 
immediate protest.  Yet Pompey was unwilling to debate.   He dispatched his lieutenant, 
Gabinius, who expelled the Parthians from the region and then, to add further insult, led 
a raiding party across the Tigris.  Since Parthia had long recognized the Euphrates as 
its westernmost boundary, Gabinius’ actions were considered equivalent to an act of 
war.  Although outraged, Phraates could do little, for he did not yet have the military 
capability to oppose the Romans.  Still, Pompey’s slight would not be soon forgotten.44 
 Once the situation had been resolved to his satisfaction, Pompey renewed his 
‘pursuit’ of Mithridates.  Leaving a garrison in Armenia, he marched north into Trans-
Caucasia and wintered 66-65 in the lower basin of the Kur valley.  This region, now 
present-day Azerbaijan, was then occupied by two tribes, the Albani and the Iberi.  After 
minor combat, Pompey forced both these peoples into treaties.  The Iberi, in particular, 
became ‘friends’ to Rome and, eventually, would prove themselves to be important 
allies.  Although Mithridates was known to be at Dioscurias in Colchis, Pompey turned 
next to the east as if planning to march to the very shores of the Caspian.  However, 
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within only three days of this objective, he halted and returned to Albania.  Mithridates 
made use of this window of opportunity to escape by sea to the Crimea.  Despite some 
criticism from Rome, Pompey broke off his ‘pursuit’ and retired first to Armenia and then 
Asia Minor.45   
Plutarch insists that Pompey’s activities in Trans-Caucasia, specifically his 
subjugation of the Albani and Iberi, were necessary steps in his advance on Mithridates.  
David Magie, among others, argues against any such possibility for, as he asserts, 
there is no evidence to suggest that these tribes ever intended to ally themselves with 
the Pontic king.  Magie proposes, instead, that the real motivation behind Pompey’s 
campaign was to consolidate the former provinces of Tigranes and to bring Roman 
hegemony to the region.  In addition to Magie, Sherwin-White claims that Pompey, 
unlike Lucullus, was never really obsessed with the capture of Mithridates.  His victory 
at Nicopolis may have seemed less than gratifying because of the ease with which it 
was achieved.  Everyone knew, after all, that it was not Pompey, but Lucullus, who 
actually reined in Mithridates.  Therefore, chasing the Pontic king may have seemed to 
Pompey as unworthy of his attention.  If he was looking for glory in the east, he would 
not find it by sifting through Lucullus’ leftovers.  He set about, therefore, extending the 
imperial frontiers and in doing so gained his fame and prestige.46          
Following his withdrawal from Trans-Caucasia, Pompey spent the next several 
years reorganizing Rome’s Asian provinces.  In Pontus, he appointed a client-prince 
and founded no less than seven new communities.  Five of these townships, Nicopolis, 
Diospolis, Magnopolis, Neapolis, and Pompeiopolis, were situated along the much-
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frequented coastal trade route from Bithynia to Armenia.  The other two, Zela and 
Megalopolis, lay on the important commercial road which ran from the Black Sea, 
through Amaseia, to Tomisa on the Euphrates.  Pompey may have been attempting to 
tap into the lucrative trading networks of Mesopotamia.  This then raises the question of 
Armenia’s economic importance.  Did Pompey and subsequent Roman commanders 
regard the territory as a necessary link to the commerce of the Far East?47 
Sherwin-White thinks this possibility unlikely.  According to Isidorus of Charax’s 
Parthian Stations, the Silk Road arrived at Seleucia, traveled up the Euphrates to 
Zeugma, and then extended overland to Antioch.  From Syria, goods were then 
distributed throughout the Roman Empire by way of the Mediterranean.  Therefore, this 
route, which does not venture any farther northwards, would seem to place most 
Armenian cities too far afield to be viable commercially.  Furthermore, in addition to the 
Silk Road, Far Eastern goods were transported by ship across the Indian Ocean and 
Red Sea to ports in Egypt or Arabia.  This southern route too makes any Armenian 
alternative seem, at first, unnecessary.48 
But this view does not reflect a consensus among scholars.  Both Charlesworth 
and Debevoise argue that the internal strife within the Parthian state and the outward 
hostility of the Nabataean kingdom of Arabia led Rome to desire its own passage to 
India and China.  Securing Armenia and territories in Trans-Caucasia may thus have 
been an attempt by the Romans to end their commercial dependence on other troubled 
regions.  Strabo does, after all, make mention of a trade route that ran north of the 
Caucasus from the Caspian Sea to the Azof.49  Although the evidence for such a theory 
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is sparse, it would at least partially explain why the Romans became so obsessed with 
the Armenian territory.50    
Still, most of the political disruption within Parthia and Arabia which Charlesworth 
and Debevoise refer to occurred during the first and second century AD, well after 
Pompey’s campaign.  It seems, therefore, unreasonable to ascribe these particular 
economic motivations to his actions.  As Magie and Sherwin-White suggest, Pompey 
was more likely interested in furthering his reputation and expanding the Empire for 
glory’s sake.  In doing so, however, he established dangerous precedents that 
eventually led Rome to question its seeming invincibility and led other men, like M. 
Crassus and M. Antony, to ruin.   
Marcus Licinius Crassus and Mark Antony 
While his political partners, Pompey and C. Julius Caesar, were embroiled in the 
affairs of Italy and Gaul, M. Crassus sought to win fame for himself farther abroad.  In 
56, he thus secured the proconsulship of Syria.  From this province, he intended to 
launch an invasion of Mesopotamia and, as Plutarch recounts, hoped to conquer “as far 
as Bactria and India and the Outer Sea.”51  Due to a lack of cavalry, however, Crassus’ 
first expedition across the Euphrates was limited to the capture of several small cities.  
Consequently, he returned to Syria where he spent the winter of 54.52 
 In the spring of 53, one thousand cavalry reinforcements arrived from Gaul under 
the command of Crassus’ son Publius.  These reserves, along with those offered by 
Artavasdes II, who was then the King of Armenia and the son of the aged Tigranes, 
gave Crassus a sizable force.  He thus set out undaunted for the Parthian capital of 
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Ctesiphon.  The course of his march, through southern Armenia into Media Atropatene, 
had been adopted after consulting Artavasdes, who himself chose to remain at Artaxata 
to defend the eastern front.  Meanwhile, the Parthian monarch Orodes II dispatched his 
most experienced general, a nobleman known only as the Suren, to intercept Crassus, 
while a larger Parthian army led by the Great King himself advanced on Armenia via the 
Araxes valley.53 
 The armies of Crassus and the Suren met near Carrhae.  Despite the Romans’ 
advantage in number, however, they were not able to turn back the Parthians’ cavalry 
lancers, or cataphracts.  Thirty thousand Roman legionaries were lost on the first day of 
battle and several thousand more were slain or captured during the disorderly retreat.  
Artavasdes, who claimed to have engaged Orodes’ army, failed to send help.  Crassus 
was himself killed after being lured away from his camp during peace negotiations.  His 
head and right hand were cut off and sent as trophies to Orodes in Armenia.54 
 Scholarly opinions vary as to the underlying reason for Crassus’ failure.  
Sherwin-White cites the Suren’s innovative tactics.  By using mounted archers in 
concert with his cataphract units, he denied the Roman infantrymen an opportunity to 
retaliate.  On the other hand, Sullivan paints Artavasdes as the betrayer of Crassus.  
For soon after Carrhae, the Armenian king entered into a marriage alliance with the 
Parthians whereby his daughter was betrothed to Orodes’s eldest son Pacorus.  Since it 
was Artavasdes who first suggested Crassus’ course through Media Atropatene, 
Sullivan suspects some form of collusion between the two kings.55      
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  Yet if blame is to be assigned for the Roman debacle at Carrhae, Crassus 
himself must receive the lion’s share.  Prior to his expedition, the Parthians were 
favorably inclined to Rome.56  His unjustified attacked can be, therefore, attributed to no 
other motivating factor than his desire for fame and fortune.  Plutarch notes that 
Crassus sought “to make the campaigns of Lucullus against Tigranes and those of 
Pompey against Mithridates seem mere child’s play.”57  Instead of besting his 
predecessors, however, Crassus succeeded only in tainting Romano-Parthian relations 
for decades. 
 In 37, Marc Antony’s legate Canidius marched into Armenia with four legions and 
secured once again the dubious allegiance of Artavasdes.  The Romans then subdued 
the Iberians and Albanians in Trans-Caucasia, presumably to prevent them from 
causing later trouble.  The following year the Parthian King Orodes, lamenting the death 
of his first son Pacorus, abdicated his throne in favor of another of his sons, Phraates 
IV.  Although there was no legitimate reason to suspect so, Phraates must have still felt 
his new position tenuous, for he immediately ordered the murder of his father and 
remaining brothers.  Many among the Parthian nobility fled, horrified that they would be 
next.58 
 One such nobleman, Monaeses, escaped to Syria and once there convinced the 
Romans to lend him aid.  Antony, who was then shoring up Rome’s eastern authority, 
welcomed the opportunity to win back Crassus’ battle standards.  Due to a strong 
enemy presence at Zeugma, however, the Romans were compelled to march first 
through Armenia.  Artavasdes himself offered to guide the Romans into Parthia.  
                                                          
56 Strabo 16.1.28. 
57 Plut. Crass. 16.2. 
58 Plut. Ant. 34.10, 37.1-2; Dio Cass. 49.23.1-24.1. 
  28
Antony, who was probably unaware of the particulars concerning Crassus’ fate, 
unknowingly accepted.  Ironically, once again, Artavasdes chose the course through 
Media Atropatene.59   
 Instead of marching immediately to Ctesiphon, Antony first besieged Phraaspa.  
While the Romans were thus occupied with the city’s defenses, the Parthians began to 
harass Antony’s scouting parties and supply lines.  The enemy’s strategy proved at first 
effective, for the mounting casualties prompted Artavasdes’ quick retreat back to 
Armenia.  Antony, who was not dissuaded by these initial losses, chose instead to 
engage the Parthian army head-on.  Although his tactics were as flawed as Crassus’ 
had been, his defeat did not quite mirror the disaster at Carrhae.  Still, after a day of 
pitched battle and no significant gains, Antony called for the withdrawal to Artaxata.  
However, on the march to Armenia, the Romans suffered terrible losses due to Parthian 
forays and famine.  Of Antony’s original seventy-seven thousand men only thirty-two 
thousand survived the harried retreat.60   
In 34, as part of the ‘Donations of Alexandria,’ Antony returned to Armenia and 
installed Alexander Helios, his young son by Cleopatra, as king.  Artavasdes was 
imprisoned and later executed; what became of his two sons, Tigranes and Artaxias, is 
unknown.  But for the next two years, Armenia remained under Roman hegemony ruled 
by a military governor.61  
Conclusion 
The first century BC witnessed both the rise and fall of Armenia’s only significant 
empire in the ancient world.  The kingdoms of Tigranes the Great and Artavasdes 
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represent the ‘Golden Age’ of Armenian autonomy.  However, these monarchs could 
not overcome their country’s great geographical handicap, its unfortunate positioning 
between the ancient superpowers of Rome and Parthia.  As that struggle intensified, 
Armenia had no choice but to try to ally itself with the stronger of the two.  After 
Carrhae, that choice seemed obvious.  But Artavasdes’ decision to back Parthia would 
be Armenia’s undoing. 
 Neither the Armenians nor the Parthians truly understood the mechanisms of 
Roman society – their tenacity and inclination for one-upmanship.  Besides being 
inherently warlike, Romans were conditioned to believe that there was nothing greater 
than winning honor and fame.  The failures of Crassus and Antony only made Parthia all 
the more attractive to upcoming glory-seekers and fortune hunters.  Artavasdes failed to 
understand that Carrhae signaled not an end, but a beginning.   
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Chapter 2 
Parthia and Armenia under the Julio-Claudian Emperors 
 
The Roman Civil Wars (49-31 BC) allowed Parthia an opportunity to make 
inroads into not only Armenia, but also Syria.  However, its occupation of these 
territories was brief.  By the end of the first century BC, the Roman emperor Augustus 
had reclaimed his Syrian province and had installed a client-king on the Armenian 
throne.  As per the terms of his treaty with Rome, the Parthian king Phraates IV 
returned the Roman battle standards lost by Crassus at Carrhae.  This symbolic triumph 
proved even more advantageous than Rome’s actual reoccupation of Syria.  Augustus’ 
propaganda machine portrayed his recovery of the standards as his greatest success 
yet.  His triumphal arch depicts a kneeling Parthian presenting him with Crassus’ 
standards and eagles.  The cuirass of Augustus’ Prima Porta statue too conveys a 
similar scene; it is, in fact, a common theme throughout the iconography of his reign.62  
In his Res Gestae, Augustus even recalled, “I compelled the Parthians to return the 
spoils and standards of three Roman armies and humbly to beg the friendship of the 
Roman people.”63 
 But why did Augustus choose to negotiate the return of the standards rather than 
to fight for them?  Both Crassus and Antony had seemed so intent on sacking 
Ctesiphon itself.  Why was Augustus so easily contented simply with an Armenian 
puppet regime and a Parthian truce?  Augustus’ response to Parthia’s incursions into 
Syria and Armenia does, at first, seem uncharacteristic of the typical Roman reprisal.  It 
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seems, however, less so once one considers his overall policy concerning the imperial 
borders.  One reason for the success of the early Principate was its consolidation of the 
overextended frontier.  With only twenty-five legions at his disposal, Augustus had to 
develop a method to manage more efficiently remote provinces.  He, therefore, 
established client-kings in areas such as Thrace, Mauretania, and the Caucasus.  His 
similar treatment of Armenia may have been part of this same policy.64 
 This explanation is, however, specious, for it assumes that Augustus and his 
fellow Romans regarded Armenia as just another subjugated territory.  This is simply 
not the case.  Armenia was uniquely situated between Rome’s restless eastern 
provinces and the rising star of Parthia.  Roman literature from this period does, in fact, 
portray Parthia less as a mere nuisance and more as a nemesis.  The poet Horace 
writes even of the “Parthians, now threatening Latium.”65  The general Roman populace 
viewed Armenia increasingly as necessary for the defense of the Empire.  But was 
Rome’s growing fear of Parthia justified or was that perceived threat merely the result of 
popular hysteria?  And, in either case, was it this fear or perhaps some other factor that 
prompted Rome’s interference in the politics of Armenia?    
Chapter 2 will attempt to demonstrate that, despite such literature and 
speculation, Rome was in no immediate danger from the Parthian state.  It will also 
make an effort to show that the Julio-Claudian emperors, although more cautious, were 
no less eager to win glory and plunder for themselves in the East.  It was their 
ambitions, and not Rome’s collective fear, that drew the Empire into the affairs of 
Armenia and Parthia.  Yet due to the debacle at Carrhae and a mounting resentment in 
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Rome for such potentially wasteful endeavors, this period is characterized more as one 
of political posturing than actual military conflict.  The Armenian throne, the key to 
hegemony in the region, was of course oftentimes the focus of these diplomatic 
maneuverings and intrigues.  Yet even in the political arena, Rome’s leaders were more 
often than not the aggressors and initiators.  The advent of the Principate may have 
changed the nature of the game, but the prize was undeniably the same. 
Parthia in Roman Literature 
Many Romans regarded Carrhae as a great military blunder and an unnecessary 
loss.  It was, nevertheless, seen initially as a mere setback on the distant frontier and 
nothing more.  Antony’s failed expedition into Mesopotamia raised further concerns 
about the Parthians at Rome, but these concerns were soon overshadowed by the 
ongoing Civil War.  A real Roman awareness of the supposed Parthian threat arose 
only after Augustus’ victory at Actium in 31 BC.  As stability returned to the Roman 
state, many people were surprised to find that that empire no longer included large 
portions of Asia Minor or the vital economic province of Syria.  Rome’s attention turned, 
therefore, to a new potential danger on its eastern horizon. 
 Although Augustus soon afterwards recaptured these occupied territories, the 
psychological damage had already been done.  Romans no longer felt as safe as they 
once had under the Republic.  For if the Parthians could take Syria, a major Roman 
province, then why cou ld they not also invade Western Anatolia, or Greece – or Italy, 
for that matter.  Horace’s exaggeration of the danger Parthia posed is, in this sense, 
better understood.  He and his fellow Romans were becoming keenly mindful of the fact 
that they were not all-powerful or invincible on the battlefield.  Similar opinions and 
fears, although some less extreme, are prevalent throughout the literature of the period. 
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 This growing Roman consciousness of Parthia and of the East is evident in the 
poetry of the Early Principate.  Besides Horace, both Virgil and Ovid make numerous 
references to Parthia, Media, Bactria, and India.  Stock phrases, such as the Parthian 
bow, the Armenian tiger, the Hyrcanian dog, and many more, persist not only in their 
works, but also well into the poetry of the second century AD.66  Propertius mentions 
repeatedly Augustus’ possible expedition in the East.67  And Seneca and Lucan still 
utilized in their day many of the same catchwords and stock phrases introduced by the 
Augustan poets.68  Such specific references to the East must reflect the general public’s 
increased awareness of and interest in Rome’s oriental affairs. 
 Roman writers, furthermore, had a long tradition of labeling those peoples 
outside the Empire as inferior and barbarian.  Beginning in the era of the Augustan 
authors, however, there is an abrupt change.  References to Parthia as ‘a Roman rival’ 
and as ‘another world’ arise.  Strabo reports: “… and now they rule over so much land 
and so many peoples, that in a way they have become rivals of the Romans in the size 
of their empire.”69  Although not a contemporary of Strabo, Dio Cassius too mentions, in 
regards to the Parthians, that “they finally advanced so much in glory and power that 
they then made war even on the Romans, and ever since have always been considered 
rivals.”70  In addition, Dio Cassius, as well as Lucan, convey the sense that the 
Parthians had become invincible in their own territory.71  Many Romans would have 
                                                          
66 Hor. Carm. 1.2, 1.12, 7.9; Epist. 1.18.56; Sat. 2.1.15; Verg. Ecl. 1.62, 10.59-60; G. 2.126-36, 
2.440, 2.466; Aen. 4.367; Ov. Am. 1.2.47, 2.5.40; Met. 2.248, 4.21.  
67 Prop. 3.1.16, 3.4.1-19, 3.5.48. 
68 Sen. Herc. fur. 909; Troades 11; Medea 373; De cons. 8.3-4; Epist. 4.7, 12.8, 71.37; Lucan 
1.230, 1.328, 3.236, 4.64, 4.680.  
69 Strabo 2.9.2. 
70 Dio Cass. 40.14.3. 
71 Ibid. 40.15.4; Lucan 8.368-371. 
  34
considered these suggestions laughable only a generation earlier when the Republic 
was at the height of its power and arrogance.72 
 The disaster at Carrhae, Antony’s failure to avenge Crassus, and Parthia’s brief 
occupation of Syria all fostered feelings of alarm and trepidation in Rome concerning 
the East.  These feelings were exacerbated by a ubiquitous Roman tendency for 
xenophobia and a general sense of anomie, which is not uncommon during periods of 
widespread civil strife.  Most Romans now believed that they were on the defensive, 
beset by the Parthian hordes.  But were they?  In hindsight, the answer seems obvious.  
Of course, they were not.  Following the Syrian invasion of 20 BC, no other oriental 
army severely threatened the Eastern frontier until the early third century.  But does this 
striking lack of an outright military conflict necessarily mean that no rivalry existed?  The 
modern Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union did not, after 
all, erupt into a full-scale confrontation.  Can this twentieth-century model be applied to 
the Romano-Parthian situation in the first century AD?  To answer such a question, we 
must examine more closely the reigns of the Julio-Claudian emperors, their policies 
towards Parthia, and their efforts to secure the much-disputed territory of Armenia. 
Caesar Augustus 
Shortly after the return of Crassus’ standards in 20 BC, Augustus sent the 
Parthian king Phraates IV an Italian slave girl named Musa for his harem.  The sources 
seem to suggest that this girl was intended as a gift and represented an act of good 
faith on Augustus’ part.  However, Debevoise is more suspicious of Musa, speculating 
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that she may have been a Roman spy sent to influence Phraates.  Such a theory is not 
wholly unreasonable once one considers some of Musa’s later actions as Phraates’ 
consort.73   
 By 10 BC, Musa’s son Phraates V, also known as Phraataces, had become old 
enough to contend for the Parthian throne.  Musa managed, therefore, to persuade her 
husband to send his other children to Rome for safe keeping, leaving her son as the 
only potential heir.  Four of Phraates’ sons, Seraspadanes, Phraates, Rhodaspes, 
Vonones, two of their wives, and four of their sons were handed over to the Roman 
governor of Syria.  They were then escorted to Rome where they and their descendents 
resided for the next half century, enjoying all the luxuries and privileges given to any of 
Rome’s royal hostages.  This exiled group of Parthian royalty formed a convenient pool 
from which the Julio-Claudian emperors later drew their candidates for the Armenian 
throne.74 
 In Armenia, meanwhile, Roman hegemony had become quite tenuous.  A party 
of Armenian nationalists had driven out the last of Antony’s Roman garrisons there and 
had accepted an alliance with Phraates.  The current rulers, Tigranes IV and his sister-
wife Erato, were briefly deposed in 5 BC by a Roman army under the command of 
Augustus’ stepson Tiberius.  A Median prince, named Artavasdes III, was installed in 
their place.  Had Phraates lived any longer Artavasdes’ throne might have remained 
secure; however, in 2 BC, Musa murdered her husband, making her son the sole ruler 
of the Parthian state.75   
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 If Musa had originally been a Roman agent, she was one no longer, for prior to 
Phraataces’ accession, she convinced the Armenian nobility to rise up against 
Artavasdes.  In the ensuing revolt, Tigranes was once again crowned as king of 
Armenia.  Augustus was, nevertheless, soon alerted to these events and dispatched his 
grandson Gaius to the eastern frontier.  Phraataces, however, was not prepared to go to 
war.  He met the approaching Roman army in person at the Euphrates and acquiesced 
to all of Gaius’ terms.  He agreed to drop Parthia’s claim to the Armenian throne and to 
allow his stepbrothers to remain as hostages at Rome, a stipulation that was most 
probably not altogether heartbreaking for Phraataces or his mother.76 
 Having secured Phraataces’ consent, Gaius then pressed northwards into 
Armenia where he arranged for Artavasdes III to resume the throne.  Gaius’ army 
remained in the territory for nearly two years, besieging the Parthian-held stronghold of 
Artagira and searching for Phraataces’ treasure stores.  The sources do suggest that 
this Armenian expedition may have been the precursor for a full-scale campaign against 
Parthia itself.  Seneca notes that Augustus sought to expand the eastern border beyond 
the Euphrates.77  But any such plans were abandoned when, in AD 3, Gaius agreed to 
parley a truce with the satrap of Artagira.  Their meeting, which was intended as a trap, 
ended in a fracas in which Gaius was mortally wounded.  His death effectively halted 
any plan Augustus had to invade Parthia.78 
 Had Gaius not died, Augustus would have surely added the Parthian kingdom to 
his long list of conquests, for it was then in no condition to oppose him.  In AD 2, 
Phraataces married his mother Musa and thus became guilty, at least in the eyes of his 
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subjects, of not only patricide, but also incest.  This act, along with his lingering status 
as an outsider due to his mother’s Italian stock, soon rallied the Parthian nobility against 
him.  By AD 4, he had either been assassinated or driven to exile in Syria.  His 
successor, an Arsacid prince named Orodes III, reigned only briefly until AD 6 when he 
too was murdered by his own disgruntled nobility.  Upon his demise, the Parthians sent 
word to Rome, requesting the return of Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates IV.  Since 
Vonones had now been living in Rome for nearly sixteen years and was practically a 
Roman himself, Augustus was more than willing to oblige them.79 
 Vonones’ western manners and habits, his disdain for horses and hunting for 
example, of course, soon made him unpopular with the Parthian nobility.  As early as 
AD 9, another Arsacid, Artabanus II,80 who was then the king of Atropatene, began 
mustering support to overthrow his distant cousin.  Although the first attempt to oust 
Vonones failed, a second revolt in AD 12 proved more successful.  Artabanus seized 
Ctesiphon and drove Vonones first to Armenia, where he reigned briefly after 
Artavasdes’ death, and then finally to exile in Syria.  Parthia’s new king wasted no time 
installing his own son Orodes on the vacant Armenian throne.  However, there was 
uncharacteristically no immediate Roman reprisal since Artabanus’ coup d’etat in both 
Parthia and Armenia occurred some time after Augustus’ death in AD 14.81   
It is, of course, debatable whether or not Augustus would have succeeded in 
annexing Parthia if Gaius had lived.  What seem less questionable were his intentions.  
Although no such expedition was ever actually launched, Seneca and Ovid make clear 
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the idea that one was planned.82  Besides this textual evidence, common sense would 
seem to suggest that Augustus’ constant jostling for position in Armenia also supports 
the theory of a possible Parthian campaign.  At the outset of his reign, Augustus was 
unwilling to risk such an endeavor for fear that it would result in another Carrhae.  He 
was content to recover Crassus’ standards and to overplay their significance.83  By the 
early first century AD, however, Parthia was in political disarray, several members of the 
Arsacid royal family were held hostage at Rome, and the Armenian throne was secure 
with Artavasdes III as king.  Such favorable conditions, no doubt, made Augustus 
reconsider a Parthian invasion.  Parthia was now, after all, Rome’s only significant rival.  
Its conquest would have certainly loomed large before Augustus as potentially his 
greatest achievement. 
Of course, no such victory was forthcoming after Gaius’ death in AD 3.  This 
setback may have even contributed to Augustus’ later decision to halt imperial 
expansion altogether.  Still, his earlier efforts in the East had already set the tone for the 
rest of the Julio-Claudian Era.  Augustus’ successors continued to plot to have their own 
candidates placed on the thrones of both Armenia and Parthia.  These candidates were 
often the sons or grandsons of Phraates IV whom Musa had sent to Rome, perhaps 
under the direct orders of Augustus himself.  Rome’s first princeps had been unable to 
conquer Parthia itself; however, policies and protocols that he established quickly 
became the model on which the later Julio-Claudian emperors based their actions in the 
East.     
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Tiberius 
By AD 18, Tiberius, Augustus’ adopted son and heir, was secure enough in his 
position as the new emperor to challenge once again Parthia’s claim to the Armenian 
throne.  He, therefore, dispatched his own adopted son, Germanicus, to the East with a 
sizable Roman army.  Artabanus’ son Orodes, who was then serving as the king of 
Armenia, most likely fled from his capital at Artaxata as Germanicus’ force approached.  
Under Roman auspices, his crown was awarded to the son of Pontus’ king Polemon, a 
young prince who soon became known as Artaxias III.84   
Germanicus then marched back to Syria where he received Artabanus’ 
ambassadors, who did not contest the regime change in Armenia.  Instead, they offered 
to become allies with the Romans in exchange for the silencing of Vonones, who had 
been attempting to raise an army in Syria ever since his exile from Armenia.  
Germanicus did not officially accept Artabanus’ terms; however, he did forcefully 
remove Vonones to Pompeiopolis in Cilicia.  Although Vonones managed to escape in 
AD 19, he was quickly recaptured and soon afterwards mysteriously assassinated.  In 
that same year, Germanicus fell ill and died near Antioch, supposedly poisoned by his 
rival Gn. Calpurnius Piso, the governor of Syria.85 
In retrospect, Germanicus’ mission to the East does seem to have been one of 
détente.  Rather than provoking the Parthians by reinstalling Vonones on the Armenian 
throne, he chose to support a less controversial candidate, Artaxias.  Of course, neither 
he nor Tiberius could openly agree to an alliance with Artabanus.  Parthia was still, after 
all, Rome’s greatest enemy.  Doing so would have likely invited much criticism from the 
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Roman aristocracy.  They chose, therefore, to bide their time and to do nothing.  This 
policy seems to have been successful, for more than a decade of eastern peace ensued 
after Germanicus’ death.  From AD 19 to 32, Tiberius sent only one short-termed 
governor to Syria.  He did, nevertheless, receive some criticism at home from Romans 
who believed that he was neglecting the frontier.  Had the Parthians advanced into 
Syria or attempted to retake Armenia during this period, such remarks might have had 
some merit; however, this does not seem to have been the case.86 
Yet Tiberius’ casual policies towards the eastern frontier were by no means a 
permanent solution.  In AD 32, Artaxias died, leaving the Armenian throne vacant once 
more.  Artabanus, who had spent the last decade consolidating his own empire, 
occupied the territory and installed his eldest son Arsaces as king.  Artabanus had 
been, no doubt, encouraged by his recent victories against several hostile tribes and by 
the Romans’ seeming torpidity.  Tacitus reports that he now considered “Tiberius as old 
and unwarlike.”87  The Parthian king was even so audacious as to send an embassy to 
the Romans demanding that they return to him the treasure left by Vonones in Syria and 
Cilicia.  This new found arrogance on Artabanus’ part disturbed not only Tiberius and 
the Romans, but also many among the Parthian nobility, who regarded such posturing 
as unproductive and dangerous.88 
 However, there were no Arsacids left in Parthia who could rightfully challenge 
Artabanus’ claim to the throne.  After nearly twenty years as Parthia’s king, he had 
managed to kill or exile anyone who had even remotely rivaled his authority.  The 
disaffected party in Ctesiphon, therefore, turned to Tiberius for assistance, requesting 
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that Prince Phraates, the youngest son of Phraates IV, be sent to Syria.  Tiberius 
acquiesced; yet Phraates, who was now nearly fifty years old, was already too ill to 
make the journey successfully.  The aged prince died en route to the East.  Undaunted, 
Tiberius next dispatched Tiridates, a grandson of Phraates IV, and appointed L. Vitellius 
governor of Syria to assist the Arsacid prince on his mission.  By AD 35, both men had 
arrived at the Euphrates and were preparing to march against Artabanus.89      
Meanwhile, Tiberius had also secured a secret arrangement with Pharasmanes, 
the king of the Iberians, the Trans-Caucasian tribe which lived on Armenia’s northern 
border.  In exchange for his allegiance to Rome, Pharasmanes was allowed to depose 
Artabanus’ son Arsaces in Armenia and to seize Artaxata for himself.  After expelling 
the Parthians, he left his brother Mithridates there as king.  A Parthian army 
commanded by Artabanus’ other son Orodes soon afterwards attempted, but failed, to 
retake the territory.  Incited by Vitellius’ agents, the Alani, another Trans-Caucasian 
tribe, flooded into Mesopotamia unopposed by the Iberians.  Vitellius and Tiridates also 
chose at this time to advance.  Foreseeing Artabanus’ eventual defeat, many Parthian 
nobles quickly defected to Tiridates’ camp.  Beset by both the Alani and the Romans 
and strategically crippled by mass desertions, Artabanus had no other option but to 
withdraw.  He abandoned Ctesiphon and fled to Parthia’s eastern border.90 
Phraates IV’s grandson reigned briefly over the Parthian Empire as Tiridates III.  
Like Vonones, however, Tiridates’ western leanings soon irritated the fickle Parthian 
nobility, who turned once again to Artabanus.  The former Parthian king, who had been 
living as a native in Hyrcania, quickly took advantage of his renewed popularity and 
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amassed an army of loyal supporters.  Tiridates sent word to Vitellius in Syria, but no 
aid was to come from the Romans.  Tiberius had grown weary of the whole ordeal and, 
late in AD 36, ordered his provincial governor to reestablish peaceful relations with 
Parthia.  Without his Roman allies to rely on, Tiridates was unable to defend his new 
capital.  In a seeming reversal of earlier events, it was now Tiridates who fled to Syria 
before the approaching Artabanus.91   
After recapturing Ctesiphon, Artabanus met with Vitellius at the Euphrates.  
Although the exact terms of their truce are unknown, not long after this conference, the 
Parthian king’s son Darius was sent to Rome as a hostage.  It seems probable that this 
deference on Artabanus’ behalf was part of a renewed Romano-Parthian peace 
agreement.  As for Armenia, the sources do not mention any further regime change 
during the last year of Tiberius’ reign.  It can be gathered, however, that Mithridates 
remained in control there since both Tacitus and Dio Cassius later relate an episode in 
which the Emperor Caligula removes him from the Armenian throne.  It is not outlandish 
to believe that the Romans would have left the Iberians in power in Armenia because, 
ever since Pompey’s invasion of Trans-Caucasia in the first century BC, that tribe had 
been considered ‘friends’ of Rome.92 
Although the Romans were now no worse off than they had been, we can not say 
the same of Parthia.  From the beginning of the Christian era to AD 40, the quick 
turnover of Parthian kings and internal strife incited by the nobility had left the country in 
a poor economic state.  During this period, there are several intervals in which it seems 
that no royal coins were minted (AD 7-9, 21-23, and 32-36).  In AD 35, in response to 
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the volatile economic situation, the commercial entrepot of Seleucia rebelled against the 
Arsacids.  This city, which was in some ways more vital to the Parthian state than 
Ctesiphon, remained in revolt for the next seven years.  Arguably, Artabanus’ long reign 
did much to alleviate some of the economic hardships; however, any such beneficial 
effects were quickly undone during his confrontation with Tiridates.93  
Caligula and Claudius 
Neither Tiberius nor Artabanus lived long enough to ensure another lasting 
peace.  By AD 38, both men had been succeeded by less competent leaders.  At Rome, 
the Emperor Caligula became involved in numerous scandals and sordid affairs, some 
so outrageous that even his sanity was called into question.  On the other hand, 
Artabanus’ heir, a Hyrcanian named Gotarzes II, upon his accession, murdered one of 
his brothers and drove the other, Vardanes, into exile.  Vardanes’ hastened return the 
following year sparked a prolonged civil war in Parthia which lasted nearly a decade.  
With such chaos brewing in both the West and the East, it should not be surprising then 
that Armenia was soon once again caught up in the troubles of its more powerful 
neighbors.94 
 Although the sources do not mention for what reason, Armenia’s king Mithridates 
was eventually recalled to Rome by Caligula and imprisoned there.  During his absence, 
Armenia was occupied by a Parthian contingent.  Upon Caligula’s assassination in AD 
41, however, his successor Claudius released Mithridates, who returned to his kingdom 
and with the help of his brother, the Iberian king Pharasmanes, regained his throne.  
Still, even after Artaxata was recaptured, Lesser Armenia remained in revolt for some 
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time and was only finally subdued with great difficulty.  Such continued resistance to 
Mithridates’ restoration, no doubt, contributed to the timbre of his later reign, which was 
often cruel and oppressive.95 
 Armenia’s distraught nobles, therefore, sent a proposal to Parthia.  In exchange 
for overthrowing Mithridates, they would be willing to accept a Parthian as their king.  
Rather than take advantage of this opportunity, Gotarzes and Vardanes chose instead 
to disagree and thereby launched a new round of violence in their ongoing civil war.  
However, their protracted conflict did not go unnoticed by Claudius, who ordered C. 
Cassius Longinus, the governor of Syria, to cross the Euphrates with several Roman 
legions.  Claudius hoped that the unstable political situation in Parthia would allow him 
to install another Mithridates, the son of Vonones I and grandson of Phraates IV, as king 
there.  Unfortunately, by the time the Roman expedition reached the northern boundary 
of the Parthian Empire, Vardanes was dead, leaving Gotarzes in command of a unified 
front.  The pretender and his Roman allies were defeated near the Corma River around 
AD 50.  In order to prevent Mithridates from ever again challenging him, Gotarzes had 
his adversary’s ears clipped so that he might never wear the Parthian crown.96 
 Gotarzes reigned uncontested only briefly following his victory at Corma.  In AD 
51, he died either of some unknown disease or as the result of a plot against him.  His 
successor Vonones II, who was also the king of Media, ruled Parthia only months 
before passing the crown to his son or brother, Vologases I.  Under Vologases, Parthia 
would find a renewed sense of stability and vigor.  Rather than struggle hopelessly with 
Seleucia and other discontent commercial elements, he established rival entrepots, 
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such as Vologasia/ Vologesocerta.  With a rejuvenated Mesopotamian economy also 
came, however, a revitalized military machine and a sense that Parthia finally had the 
means to take the offensive against Rome.  At no other time during the Julio-Claudian 
dynasty would Armenia be so embroiled in its neighbors’ affairs.  It is to this 
confrontation, between Vologases and his Roman adversary, the Emperor Nero, that 
our story now turns.97 
Nero 
By AD 52, Mithridates’ harsh rule in Armenia had also alienated him from his 
brother Pharasmanes, the Iberian king.  Since the Parthians had been unable to take 
the initiative in that territory, Pharasmanes sent his son Rhadamistus to wrench control 
of Armenia from his tyrannical sibling.  Mithridates’ forces quickly proved ineffective, and 
he and his family were soon besieged at a fortress near Artaxata.  Although a Roman 
garrison, commanded by the prefect Caelius Pollio, had been stationed there to protect 
the Armenian king, Mithridates was unable to match the bribe offered to his defenders 
by the Iberians.  After several days, Pollio’s greed got the better of him.  He handed 
over his charge to Rhadamistus, who murdered his uncle and thus seized Armenia for 
himself.  Ummidius Quadratus, the Roman legate of Syria, made several half-hearted 
attempts to recapture the territory, but he eventually withdrew to preserve the peace 
once Vologases took the throne in Parthia.98 
 Vologases had, on the other hand, few reservations about invading Armenia.  His 
first expedition, which began about AD 52, drove Rhadamistus into hiding and captured 
the important Armenian cities of Artaxata and Tigranocerta.  However, the Parthians 
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were ill-prepared for the bitter Armenian winter.  Vologases thus withdrew his forces to 
Mesopotamia until the following year when he launched another campaign into 
Armenia, now better provisioned.  This second expedition too met with little resistance; 
and, at Vologases’ behest, his brother assumed the Armenian throne as Tiridates I.  
However, news of these events in Armenia did not reach Rome until late in AD 54.99 
By then, the Emperor Claudius was already dead, poisoned by members of his 
own household.  His adopted son, Nero, although young, was soon hailed as the new 
Princeps.  Nero’s advisors recommended that he take quick and decisive action in 
resolving the situation in Armenia.  He, therefore, appointed Cn. Corbulo, one of Rome’s 
most experienced generals, as commander of the Empire’s eastern frontier.  Corbulo 
arrived in Syria several months later where he met Quadratus and inspected the legions 
there.  He found Rome’s eastern army in disarray, unready for the protracted conflict 
that he anticipated.  He began widespread training exercises and restructured the 
cohorts.  By late in AD 57, Corbulo felt that his troops were prepared to proceed into 
Armenia.100 
 Tiridates, who knew that he could not succeed in pitched battle against the 
Romans, dispatched cavalry units to harry Corbulo’s army as it entered the Armenian 
highlands.  However, neither these raids nor that year’s difficult winter broke the 
Romans’ resolve.  As Corbulo approached Artaxata, Tiridates fled, probably to 
Vologases’ court at Ctesiphon.  So that his adversary might have nothing to return to, 
Corbulo then ordered the Armenian capital burned.  Despite this loss, Tiridates soon 
reappeared at the command of a meager Parthian army and attempted to retake his 
                                                          
99 Ibid. 12.51-52.  
100 Ibid. 13.10-12, 34-35. 
  47
kingdom.  Yet his earlier fears proved true, and he was beaten back by the Romans 
with ease.  By AD 60, Corbulo was in complete control of the territory.  Nero thus made 
Tigranes V, a grandson of Cappadocia’s monarch, Rome’s new client-king in Armenia.  
Corbulo meanwhile returned to Syria where he replaced Quadratus as provincial 
governor.101 
 Vologases received much criticism in Parthia for not offering more aid to his 
deposed brother, despite the fact that he had been otherwise occupied with tribal revolts 
in Hyrcania at the time.  He thus used Tigranes’ invasion of Adiabene in AD 61 as an 
excuse to renew hostilities in Armenia.  His forces quickly overwhelmed Tigranes’ native 
troops and cornered the Armenian king at Tigranocerta.  Corbulo, who was a better 
logistician than Quadratus, was nevertheless prepared for these events.  He instantly 
dispatched two legions to assist Tigranes, refortified Rome’s various outposts on the 
Euphrates, and sent word to Nero requesting an additional eastern commander.  
Realizing that he was outmatched, Vologases broke off his siege of Tigranocerta.  
However, refusing to abandon his objective, he sent ambassadors to Rome formally 
requesting the reinstatement of his brother as Armenia’s king.  Nero, of course, almost 
immediately denied his request and instead appointed L. Caesennius Paetus as 
governor of Cappadocia to aid Corbulo.102 
 Paetus, who would ultimately prove to be Rome’s undoing in the East, crossed 
into Armenia around AD 62 with the intention of taking the offensive against Vologases.  
He first secured Tigranocerta, then proceeded south along the Arsanias River, a 
tributary of the Euphrates.  Although Paetus had foolishly left many of his best cohorts 
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in Cappadocia, his true failings as a field commander were yet to come.  His inept 
timetable forced him to camp for the winter at the nearby town of Rhandeia.  During 
these months, his casual attitude towards training and the harsh winter weather 
weakened the resolve of his soldiers.  As the weather improved, rather than resume his 
march, Paetus lingered unnecessarily at Rhandeia.103   
Prompted by the Romans’ faltering, Vologases commenced with a preemptive 
strike of his own.  He launched simultaneous attacks against both Syria and Armenia.  
Corbulo, who was already well positioned at the Euphrates crossing of Zeugma, only 
narrowly prevented the Parthians from advancing into his province.  Paetus was 
meanwhile roused to action and took the field against Vologases’ general Monaeses in 
southern Armenia.  However, the poorly prepared Roman forces were no match for the 
crack Parthian troops.  After being badly beaten, Paetus retired to Rhandeia with the 
remnants of his army.  He then further exacerbated the situation by misrepresenting the 
severity of his defeat to Corbulo, who therefore did not deem it necessary to send 
reinforcements.104   
Vologases, on the other hand, was well informed about the weakened Roman 
position in Armenia.  Upon receiving word of Monaeses’ victory, he abandoned his push 
to capture Syria and turned the brunt of his attack instead towards Paetus’ force.  
Paetus now had little choice but to swallow his pride.  He sent a message to Corbulo 
explaining the seriousness of his situation and requested immediate assistance.  
Corbulo wasted no time and set out swiftly with several legions.  However, his forced 
march from Zeugma would be for naught, for within only three days from Rhandeia, he 
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received news that Paetus had come to terms with the Parthians.  These terms were, of 
course, unfavorable for the Romans, who were required to withdraw from Armenia.105   
Later in 63, both sides met to discuss a more permanent armistice.  Corbulo 
agreed to remove Rome’s fortresses on the Euphrates if the Parthians would abandon 
their claim to Armenia.  Vologases consented and, for the moment, the question of 
Armenia’s throne remained unresolved.  However, a Parthian embassy, which appeared 
before Nero in Italy, soon presented him with an interesting arrangement.  If Nero would 
accept an Arsacid candidate in Armenia, Vologases would allow the man to be crowned 
by the emperor himself at Rome.  Although tied by heredity to the Parthian state, this 
man would effectively be a Roman vassal.  While the idea was much debated, Nero 
finally accepted the Parthian offer and eventually approved Vologases’ brother Tiridates 
for the position.  As a gesture of good will, Tiridates then appeared in Corbulo’s camp in 
Syria.  He paid homage to a statue of Nero, which was there, removed his diadem and 
placed it at the effigy’s feet.106  
In 66, Tiridates departed for Italy with a retinue of three thousand guards and 
attendants.  His overland journey, which lasted nine months, was financed by the 
Roman treasury at the staggering cost of 800,000 sesterces per day.  Many of the local 
towns along his route through Asia Minor and Illyricum held festivities in his honor.  But 
Tiridates was cautious not to let his celebrated status get the better of him.  When he 
met Nero at Neapolis, he did obeisance to the Emperor, who rewarded him with a 
gladiatorial exhibition.  The pair then traveled to Rome where, before a huge crowd of 
onlookers, Tiridates proclaimed Nero his master and god.  Nero, in turn, replaced the 
                                                          
105 Tac. Ann. 15.11-17, Dio Cass. 62.21-22. 
106 Tac Ann. 15.18, 24-32; Dio Cass. 62 (63.1-7); Sue. Nero 13. 
  50
diadem which Tiridates had willingly removed and named him as Armenia’s king, 
granting him the regalia of his new office.  He then bestowed his new vassal with gifts, 
which Dio reports were valued in excess of 200,000,000 sesterces.  After several days 
of revelry, Tiridates left Rome with Nero’s blessing and began the long journey home, 
where he used much of the emperor’s munificence to rebuild his capital at Artaxata.107                          
Nero’s acknowledgement of Tiridates as Armenia’s legitimate ruler was 
unprecedented.  For nearly a century, Rome and Parthia had been unable to agree on a 
single candidate for that throne.  Even throughout periods of relative peace, such as 
during Artaxias’ lengthy reign from AD 18 to 32, either one side or the other would 
remain adamant, refusing to endorse Armenia’s monarch.  Nero’s acceptance of a 
Parthian candidate, and an Arsacid one at that, is therefore nothing less than a 
watershed in the story of Romano-Parthian relations.  And although the aftereffects of 
Nero’s decision will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter, it is important here 
to note that, following Tiridates’ long reign, Rome’s preferred course of action in the 
region – which, since Augustus’ time, had been politics and diplomacy – became the 
outright use of military force. 
Conclusion 
Modern scholars are sometimes mistaken when they too quickly credit the 
Roman writers with a keen understanding of the classical world.  Such is the case when 
we examine Romano-Parthian relations during the Early Principate.  In several 
instances, Roman authors expressed legitimate fears about Parthia’s potential for 
conquest.  The poet Horace even took time to warn his audience of the threat that 
Parthia posed to Italy.  However, it should be clearer now that such concerns were not 
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grounded in the facts and resulted instead from popular hysteria, which arose following 
Crassus’ and Antony’s shocking defeats in Mesopotamia.   
 Throughout the Julio-Claudian Period, Parthia was hardly the looming danger 
that Rome’s writers penned it to be.  Due to the fickleness of its nobility, its leadership 
was often in shambles; and the constant chaos of its political environment, in turn, 
brought its economy to ruin.  Even Artabanus’ long reign proved fruitless in the end 
once he chose to entangle himself in the affairs of Armenia.  Of the numerous kings 
who ruled Parthia during this period, only Vologases was able to win any lasting 
concessions from Rome.  And even then, Armenia could hardly be considered prized 
real estate. 
 Still, the absence of any real Parthian threat does not alter in any great fashion 
our modern understanding of Roman expansion in the East.  After all, a perceived 
danger could just as easily have elicited a similar response.  If the Romans just believed 
that they were beset by Parthian hordes, they would have acted accordingly.  However, 
what is important to remember is the fact that individual Romans dictated frontier policy 
and not the Empire’s citizenry as a whole.  It was the ambitions of Rome’s emperors, 
and not the collective fears of its people, that led to its constant interference in the 
politics of Armenia and Parthia.  That collective fear, real or imagined, merely showed 
Rome’s leaders where best to win honor and glory for themselves.   
 It is difficult then to equate Rome’s actions in Armenia and Parthia with notions of 
defensive imperialism.  Despite the caveats of its writers, Rome was in no immediate 
danger from the East.  A more likely reason for its military endeavors in the region 
seems then to be those same personal wants and desires discussed in Chapter 1.  
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Augustus may have officially halted imperial expansion and in doing so defined the 
borders of the Roman Empire, but he could not as easily immure Roman ambition.  
  53
Chapter 3 
Trajan’s Parthian Campaign 
 
 In AD 72, L. Caesennius Paetus, the Roman governor of Syria, informed the 
emperor Vespasian of a potential alliance between Antiochus of Commagene and 
Vologases against Rome.  Since such an arrangement would threaten the longstanding 
Neronian peace, Vespasian authorized Paetus to invade and to depose the 
Commagenian monarch.  Although Antiochus’ two sons, Epiphanes and Callinicus, 
managed to rally a small army against the Romans, their forces were soon 
overwhelmed.  Meanwhile, Antiochus, who did not share in his sons’ misplaced 
confidence, fled to Parthia.  Yet because he had not actually taken up arms himself, he 
was allowed to surrender to the Roman authorities and to live out the remainder of his 
days in Sparta with a considerable stipend.108 
 This incident prompted Vespasian to abandon the Neronian détente and to adopt 
once again a hard-line approach to the eastern frontier.  Rather than install a new 
monarch on the throne of Commagene, he chose to annex the territory and along with it 
western Armenia.  This audacious move on the part of the Romans elicited no objection 
from the Parthians, who were otherwise occupied defending their northern borders from 
marauding hordes of Alani tribesmen.  By AD 75, in an ironic twist of fate, Vologases 
even requested aid from Rome against these invaders, who had already overrun 
Hyrcania and Media Atropatene, deposing there the Parthian king’s brother Pacorus.  In 
response, Vespasian sent troops to assist the Iberian king Mithridates and to fortify his 
strongholds at Metskheta and Tiflis.  Vologases hoped that the emperor’s sons, Titus 
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and Domitian, would then be dispatched to confront the Alani, but no such expedition 
materialized.109 
 The Parthian king’s ongoing struggle against these northern invaders eventually 
made his throne vulnerable to both political and military rivals.  Although the literary 
sources concerning this period are silent, numismatic evidence suggests that, sometime 
around AD 79, Vologases was replaced by someone named Pacorus II.  However, the 
accession of this new king did not return stability to the Parthian state.  Both continuing 
pressure from the Alani and the appearance of another contender for the throne named 
Vologases III resulted in two lengthy periods (AD 84-93 and 95-105) when no royal 
coins were minted for Pacorus at Seleucia or Ctesiphon.  Furthermore, Pacorus’ brother 
or brother-in-law, a nobleman known as Osroes, began producing coinage bearing his 
own image ca. AD 109/10.  Eventually Pacorus disappears almost altogether from the 
sources, leaving Vologases III and Osroes in a heated contest for the Parthian 
throne.110 
 The internal squabbling of the Parthian leadership did not go unnoticed at Rome.  
Towards the end of his reign, Domitian made preparations to invade Mesopotamia.  He, 
no doubt, hoped to take advantage of Parthia’s fractured political situation.  Yet his 
plans did not come to fruition, for in AD 96 his unpopularity at Rome resulted in a 
household plot against him.  However, his death granted Parthia only a temporary 
reprieve.  His successor, Nerva, paid little attention to the eastern frontier while he 
attempted to restore order in Italy and the western provinces.  It was perhaps for this 
reason that, in AD 110, Osroes felt the moment right to dethrone the Armenian king 
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Tiridates, the aged Arsacid appointed by Nero himself, and replace him with Axidares, 
one of Pacorus’ sons.  This act would be portrayed by Nerva’s heir, the emperor Trajan, 
as a defiling of the pact established long ago under Nero.  Since Osroes had made no 
effort to seek Roman approval for his Armenian appointee, Trajan was able to use this 
incident as an excuse to launch his own invasion of Armenia and Mesopotamia.111 
   Trajan’s Parthian War is, in many ways, the climax of our story.  It is the 
culmination of nearly two centuries of political posturing and bitter rivalry.  Yet it is also, 
at the same time, part of our larger theme of Roman aggression, Parthian disunity – 
and, indeed, unfulfilled plans.  For although Trajan was the first emperor to carry out an 
invasion of Mesopotamia itself, he was not the only Roman leader to dream of such a 
conquest.  Crassus, Antony, Caesar Augustus, Nero, and Domitian all had made similar 
plans.  Yet, like those of his predecessors, Trajan’s grand scheme for Armenia and 
Mesopotamia would ultimately be cut short by unforeseen circumstances – in this case, 
his own untimely death.   
Chapter 3 will examine Trajan’s campaign, its motivations, and its aftereffects.  It 
will attempt to portray this particular conflict as merely another instance of Roman 
avarice and glory-hunting.  Yet it will also draw conclusions from the two preceding 
chapters, making a case for on-going Roman aggression throughout the first two 
centuries AD.  Why, after all, did the Romano-Parthian conflict come to a head here and 
now in the second century under Trajan’s watch?  And what were the lasting results of 
that endgame?    
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Optimus Princeps 
In the fall of AD 113, Trajan departed Rome by ship for the East, sailing first to 
Athens.  There, he was met by Parthian legates, who informed him of Osroes’ desire to 
avert war.  In an effort to mollify Trajan, the Parthian king had deposed Axidares, whom 
he now formally requested be replaced with Parthamasiris, another of Pacorus’ sons.  
However, if Osroes hoped that this last-ditch act would deter a confrontation with Rome, 
he was wrong.  Trajan made no attempt whatsoever to acknowledge the Parthian olive 
branch, choosing instead to proceed straight to Antioch where he continued his war 
preparations.112 
 That winter, Trajan drew up several legions and auxiliary units from Egypt and 
Pannonia.  These troops, along with those legions traditionally stationed in Syria, Judea, 
and Commagene, made up the brunt of his expeditionary force.  In the spring of AD 
114, with his army thus assembled, he advanced to Melitene and, from there, marched 
unopposed into Lesser Armenia.  At Satala, numerous tribal leaders from the Caucasus 
region appeared to welcome Trajan and to declare their allegiance to him.  The Roman 
emperor exchanged gifts with Anchialus, the king of the Heniochi and Machelones, and 
held audiences with the rulers of the Iberians, Sarmatians, and Colchians.113   
 Since Trajan’s arrival in Athens, Parthamasiris too had been attempting to secure 
a meeting with the Roman leader.  When his request was finally granted, he presented 
himself to Trajan at Elegia.  In a memorable scene, the Armenian king removed his 
diadem and placed it at Trajan’s feet, no doubt hoping to reenact the ceremony of 
Tiridates’ investiture by Nero.  However, Trajan did not replace the diadem as Nero 
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once had done.  Instead, the Roman emperor took Parthamasiris’ act as a sign of his 
surrender and declared Armenia henceforth a Roman province.  Parthamasiris, who 
could do little more than protest, was escorted from Trajan’s camp by a Roman cavalry 
detachment and slain.114 
 Trajan then proceeded to consolidate his new province.  He appointed a 
procuratorial governor, whom R. P. Longden and Debevoise have identified with 
difficulty as either L. Catilius Severus, C. Atilius Claudius, or T. Haterius Nepos.  All 
three men were prominent officials in the early reorganization of Armenia.  Trajan also 
dispatched Lucius Quietus against the Mardi, a hostile tribe which supposedly lived east 
of Lake Van.  According to Arrian, Quietus first destroyed this tribe and then garrisoned 
an area near the ‘Caspian Gates.’  With the successful subjugation of Armenia and the 
surrounding territories, Trajan felt the moment right to accept, at the Senate’s behest, 
the appellation ‘Optimus,’ a title which he would prize above all others as a reflection of 
his character.115 
 Despite having thus conquered Armenia, Trajan was not yet ready to abandon 
his eastern campaign.  He next proceeded southward into Adiabene, intending to 
besiege the fortress of Adenystrae, the principle stronghold of Adiabene’s ruler 
Mebarsapes.  Because Mebarsapes was sympathetic to Parthia, this siege might have 
delayed Trajan some time had not a captured Roman centurion named Sentius rallied 
his fellow prisoners against the fortress’s garrison.  As it was, however, due to Sentius’ 
revolt, the Romans easily occupied Adenystrae, forcing Mebarsapes to flee.  From 
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Adiabene, Trajan then advanced to the region near Edessa, where he similarly hoped to 
rein in the vacillating Abgarus VII.  Although Abgarus had been called earlier to an 
audience with Trajan, he had failed to appear.  His loyalty to Rome was thus 
questionable, and so Trajan felt that a display of force was necessary.  Once the full 
Roman panoply appeared before Edessa’s walls, Abgarus had little choice but to 
comply.  He immediately sent out gifts of weapons and troops to Trajan as a sign of his 
fealty.  Although the emperor returned most of these offerings, he did confirm Abgarus 
as Edessa’s phylarch.116                
Having thus secured the allegiance of Abgarus, the Romans then moved rapidly, 
capturing the cities of Nisibis and Batnae.  For these victories, the Senate awarded 
Trajan the title of ‘Parthicus’ and issued coins bearing the inscription ARMENIA ET 
MESOPOTAMIA IN POTESTATEM P. R. REDACTAE.  Despite such encouragement 
from Rome, Trajan could not risk proceeding any further during the winter months.  He, 
therefore, garrisoned Nisibis and returned to Syria to await the spring.  Interestingly 
enough, however, this decision to retire resulted in the closest call Trajan would have 
during the entire campaign; for in the winter of 115, a devastating earthquake struck 
Antioch, destroying most of the city.  Trajan sought shelter in the hippodrome and, by 
doing so, only narrowly escaped death.117 
In the spring, Trajan returned to Nisibis and began preparations to restart the 
campaign.  He first inspected a fleet of boats, which he had ordered his soldiers to 
construct during his absence.  This fleet was then carried overland from Nisibis to the 
Tigris where it was used to cross the river.  Trajan quickly recaptured Adiabene, which 
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had recently fallen to Osroes, and officially converted the territory into the new Roman 
province of Assyria.  All evidence then points to a long Roman march down the 
Euphrates River during which Trajan visited Phaliga, Dura-Europus, and Tyre.  A fleet 
similar to the one constructed at Nisibis sailed alongside the advancing army.  Just 
north of Ctesiphon, this flotilla was transferred to the Tigris in preparation for Trajan’s 
attack on the Parthian capital.118   
However, these elaborate maneuvers proved unnecessary, for Ctesiphon fell 
without much resistance.  Osroes, who was then in control of the city, had fled prior to 
the Romans’ arrival, leaving behind not only his famous golden throne, but also his 
daughter.  On February 20, 116, Trajan entered the city as a true conqueror amidst the 
cheers of his soldiers and commanded that a heavy tribute be imposed on his new 
subjects.  His victory was honored by the Senate, which issued coins displaying his 
image and the inscription PARTHIA CAPTA.  Although no mention is made of nearby 
Seleucia, numismatic evidence suggests that Pacorus was still in power there.  
Debevoise speculates that Trajan may have reached some agreement with the divested 
Parthian monarch.  Perhaps Trajan spared Seleucia because he intended to use 
Pacorus in his later restructuring of the Parthian kingdom.119 
Such a line of inquiry is, however, a moot point, for dramatic events which 
followed Ctesiphon’s fall soon overshadowed any plans Trajan may have had to rebuild 
the war torn kingdom.  That winter, Trajan sailed down the Tigris and occupied the cities 
of Akra, Oratha, and Apamea.  He journeyed to the Persian Gulf and, on his return 
voyage, stopped at Babylon where he visited the supposed room in which Alexander 
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the Great had died.  While at Babylon, Trajan first learned of widespread rebellion in 
northern Mesopotamia.  Most of these revolts were local uprisings prompted by Osroes’ 
brother Mithridates, who had recently recaptured large tracts of Roman territory.  
Although Mithridates was soon killed in an equestrian accident, his son Sanatruces 
continued to defy Roman authorities and to incite further pro-Parthian resistance.120   
Trajan dispatched his generals Appius Maximus and L. Quietus to quell these 
revolts.  Although Maximus died while fighting somewhere near the Taurus, Quietus 
succeeded in reconquering most of central Mesopotamia.  Besides retaking Nisibis, he 
also razed Edessa, which once again had taken up the Parthian banner.  He put down 
its rebelling Jewish population and drove the traitorous Abgarus into exile.  However, 
Quietus’ tenuous position in the upper Euphrates valley was still vulnerable to 
Sanatruces’ counterattack.  Osroes thus sent a large Parthian army commanded by his 
son Parthamaspates to reinforce his nephew.  Yet fortunately for Quietus, this Parthian 
prince was more pragmatic than loyal.  He struck a deal with Trajan, offering his 
alliegance in exchange for the Parthian throne.  Thus, Parthamaspates and Quietus 
combined their forces and together defeated the remnants of Sanatruces’ struggling 
army.121    
However, resistance to Roman occupation continued to plague Trajan even after 
the collapse of Sanatruces’ rebels.  In Armenia, Sanatruces’ son Vologases III 
orchestrated a successful revolt against that province’s local administrators.  Since 
Trajan was otherwise occupied besieging the Parthian stronghold of Hatra and had no 
more manpower to spare, he granted Vologases a considerable portion of Armenia in 
                                                          
120 Arrian Parthica bk. 16 frs. 15-16, 69, and 75; Dio Cass. 68.29-30 (75.9). 
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return for amicable relations.  When a dearth of supplies then forced him to quit his 
siege, Trajan decided to recall all but his northernmost troops from Mesopotamia.  He 
intended to return the following year to shore up his newly won provinces and to restart 
the campaign wherever necessary; however, his health, which had been steadily 
deteriorating for several months, soon forced him to abandon any such plans.  While 
preparing to sail home to Italy in August of 117, his chronic illness finally overcame 
him.122 
The Case for Premeditation 
Our account of Trajan’s Parthian campaign is derived primarily from two classical 
texts – Arrian’s Parthica and Dio Cassius’ Roman History.  However, despite their 
incalculable historic value, both sources possess a key fault which cannot easily be 
overlooked.  The relevant passages in Arrian’s and Dio’s works, which were preserved 
mainly due to the efforts of the tenth-century Byzantine culturist Constantine VII, exist 
today only in the form of fragments and epitomes.  Consequently, our picture of Trajan’s 
Parthian war is, at best, an incomplete one.  Yet the scanty evidence available has not 
deterred scholars from attempting to extrapolate the true causes of the war.  It 
behooves us now to examine some of these theories, their merits, and their relevance 
to our overall theme of Roman aggression.   
In his 1931 paper titled “Notes on the Parthian Campaigns of Trajan,” R. P. 
Longden reviewed Pliny’s Bythinian Letters, hoping to disprove popular notions that 
Trajan had long planned to invade Mesopotamia.  Longden’s fellow academics123, who 
desperately sought to ascribe premeditated motives to Trajan’s actions, had previously 
                                                          
122 Dio Cass. 68.30 (75.9)-31, 33.  
123 Perhaps the best known advocate of the premeditation theory is Dr. O. Cuntz, “Zum 
Briefwechsel des Plinius mit Traian,” Hermes 61 (1926). 
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used passages in Pliny to these ends.  In Epp. xxvii and xxviii, for example, Pliny grants 
his procurator Maximus an extraordinary amount of grain for distribution among his 
soldiers.  Proponents of a case for premeditation suggest that this extra grain might 
have been used to feed troops mobilizing for a large-scale campaign.  And since these 
letters are dated as early as AD 111, it might seem as though Trajan was planning a 
preemptive strike against the Parthians.  However, as Longden points out, drawing this 
conclusion from such circumstantial evidence is not only dangerous, but also foolish.  
The additional food stuffs could just as easily have been intended for storage in the 
provincial granaries.124 
Furthermore, in Epp. lxiii, lxiv, and lxvii, Pliny relates an incident in which an 
imperial freedman named Lycormas requested that an embassy from the kingdom of 
Bosporus be detained in Bithynia until his arrival.  Although some scholars have 
interpreted this episode as a race between Lycormas and the Bosporans to report 
urgent news from the eastern frontier to Trajan, Longden thoroughly dismisses such an 
explanation.  Instead, he suggests that Lycormas had somehow fallen out of favor with 
the Bosporan king, who was attempting to relay the freedman’s indiscretion to Roman 
authorities.  And finally, in Ep. lxxiv, Pliny apologizes to Trajan for delaying a messenger 
named Callidromus, who had learned that the Dacian king Decebalus was sending gifts 
to the Parthian court.  Advocates of the premeditation argument claim that this 
correspondence proves Trajan had good reason to contemplate an invasion of Parthia.  
Although Longden agrees, he is careful to point out that the letter does not include the 
emperor’s response to this disturbing news.  Perhaps upon hearing of Decebalus’ 
possible alliance with Parthia, Trajan did, indeed, begin planning his future conquest of 
                                                          
124 Plin. Ep. 27-28; Longden “Parthian Campaigns of Trajan” 19-20. 
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Mesopotamia; or, as Longden suggests, perhaps he did nothing at all.  Without that 
crucial piece of information, this letter cannot be used to either prove or disprove a case 
for premeditation.125     
Longden’s rejection of so-called ‘premeditated’ evidence in Pliny’s Bithynian 
Letters eventually gave rise to what has become known as the frontier theory.  
According to this view, Trajan never intended to invade Mesopotamia.  Originally, he 
merely sought to retake Armenia and to restore Rome’s eastern borders.  Only after 
doing so, did he eventually realize his folly, for he suddenly came to regard Parthia as a 
continual threat to Roman security.  For lack of any evidence to the contrary, Longden 
thus sees Trajan’s Mesopotamian campaign as an impromptu undertaking and not as 
the result of a purposed war.  Yet such a theory, while tempting, does not take into 
account our modern understanding of the Roman psyche or our knowledge of Trajan’s 
personality.  Just because Longden found no concrete evidence proving premeditation, 
are we really to assume that Trajan only realized the danger Parthia posed after his 
recapture of Armenia?  To think so would certainly seem to be giving Trajan less credit 
than he deserves.126   
In 1937, however, J. Guey published his paper “Essai sur la guerre parthique de 
Trajan (114-117),” in which he attempted to explain the war as the result of Trajan’s 
excessive greed.  Guey proposes that, following the Dacian war, the emperor needed a 
new source of wealth to continue his elaborate building projects, such as his forum in 
Rome.  This economic view of the war also suggests that Trajan may have been trying 
to commandeer Parthia’s all-important trade routes to the Far East.  He had, after all, 
                                                          
125 Plin. Ep. 63-64, 67, 74; Longden “Parthian Campaigns of Trajan” 20-21. 
126 Longden “Parthian Campaigns of Trajan” 25-29. 
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already annexed the Nabataean kingdom in 106, probably for these same purposes.  
But if this theory is correct, then Guey would need to demonstrate that Trajan intended 
all along to invade Parthia.  Therefore, his paper takes up once again the challenge of 
proving premeditation.127 
Unfortunately, Guey relies heavily on Pliny’s letters, yet does not offer much to 
refute Longden’s arguments.  Instead, he introduces other evidence of troop 
deployments to buttress his own theory of premeditation.  For if it could be shown that 
Trajan dispatched a large number of soldiers to the eastern front prior to the beginning 
of the war in 113, then there would be no question about his ultimate intentions.  He 
would have done so only if he had planned to engage a substantial force during the 
course of a prolonged campaign.  As proof, Guey cites an inscription from Ancyra, 
which describes the prestigious career of Tiberius Julius Severus, a local man who 
became a prominent public official during the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius.  
The closing lines of the inscription mention that Roman troops wintered at Ancyra during 
a ‘Parthian war,’ which Guey claims could have only been Trajan’s.  Although there is 
no evidence pinpointing an exact date, he insists that this quartering must have 
occurred before 113.  A similar inscription from Thyateira also records Roman troop 
deployments, possibly in Galatia, during the second century.  Guey argues that the 
specific legions mentioned in the inscription were only utilized during Trajan’s campaign, 
but there is no real proof that these forces were not also used later in either Hadrian’s 
Jewish war or L. Verus’ own Parthian expeditions.128      
                                                          
127 Zbigniew T. Fiema, “The Roman Annexation of Arabia: A General Perspective,” The Ancient 
World XV (1987): 35; and for Guey’s argument reference Lepper Trajan’s Parthian War 158-63. 
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On the other hand, F. A. Lepper’s Trajan’s Parthian War (1948) does not 
completely endorse either Longden or Guey’s views.  Lepper sees the frontier theory as 
too simplistic and believes that it fails to take into account the Roman predilection for 
glory-hunting and plundering.  Yet, on the other hand, he regards the economic theory 
as equally flawed, for he does not consider the evidence convincing enough to support 
Guey’s conclusions.  Lepper seems instead to favor the opinions of more contemporary 
writers, such as Dio Cassius and Dio Chrysostom, who insist that Trajan invaded 
Mesopotamia primarily for the purpose of winning fame and prestige.129   
Lepper is careful to point out that Trajan was, prior to his Parthian campaign, 
rarely accused of egoism or vainglory.  Of the numerous titles voted to him by the 
Senate, he prized ‘Optimus’ above all the rest specifically for its non-military 
connotations.  So why then does Dio Cassius say, in regards to Trajan’s eastern war, 
that his “real reason was a desire to win renown,” even though such a statement 
blatantly contradicts everything that is known about the emperor’s character?  Most 
modern scholars simply dismiss Dio’s comment as an unfounded accusation 
disseminated later by Hadrian’s administration to show Trajan’s conquests as a 
mistake.  However, Lepper proposes that Dio’s remark, although inconsistent, may in 
fact be true, once we take into account Trajan’s failing health and mental state.  The 
emperor’s symptoms, a loss of strength, dropsy, and partial paralysis as the result of a 
stroke, do after all suggest the onset of heart failure, perhaps even accompanied by 
mental impairment.130   
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Lepper’s theory is further corroborated by the remarks of Dio Chrysostom, who, 
in his fourth kingship oration, plainly compares Trajan to Alexander the Great.  
Chrysostom boldly accuses Alexander, and thus Trajan himself, of being a ‘slave to 
glory’ and, as Lepper suggests, ‘burning to conquer Babylon and Persia.’  We know that 
Trajan held the Macedonian conqueror in high esteem, for after his trip to the Persian 
Gulf he took time to visit Alexander’s death-chamber.  However, the fact that this 
speech may have been performed for Trajan on his birthday in 103 or 104 has led 
scholars, such as J. Moles, to believe that critical remarks such as these were most 
probably added in at some later time.  Yet, regardless of whether or not the Emperor 
was privy to these specific comments, the implications are obvious.  Chrysostom, like 
Dio Cassius, probably looked upon Trajan as a glory-hunter, someone overly concerned 
with his reputation and legacy.131   
But are we simply to ignore suggestive statements in Pliny’s letters or 
inscriptions, such as those cited by Guey, just because they cannot be easily 
substantiated elsewhere?  Lepper certainly does not think we should.  In fact, he freely 
admits that Trajan may have had other secondary motivations for conquering Parthia, 
including those proposed by Longden and Guey.  His argument is able to allow for such 
possibilities because his theory does not hinge on the idea of premeditation.  Perhaps 
Trajan long planned to invade Mesopotamia; or perhaps he only chose this course 
following the collapse of resistance in Armenia.  In either case, Lepper sees the pursuit 
of glory ultimately as the driving force behind Trajan’s actions.132 
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However, our purpose in reviewing these theories is not to debate further 
Trajan’s motivations.  Obviously, due to the absence of new evidence, any additional 
discussion of the topic would, at best, be only speculatory.  Our intent is rather to 
emphasize the general lack of responsibility for the war that modern scholars ascribe to 
Parthia.  Despite the fact that Osroes was technically guilty of breaking the Neronian 
peace, none of the historians mentioned here seem to blame him for the war itself.  How 
could they, considering that the Parthian embassy which met Trajan at Athens tried so 
desperately to dissuade him from engaging in further hostilities?  Osroes was then still 
trying to consolidate his own powers and defeat his rivals, Pacorus and Vologases III.  
Why would he have, at that moment, risked everything by intentionally provoking 
Rome?  Indeed, what is interesting here about Longden, Guey, and Lepper’s theories is 
not their differences, but rather their one particular similarity.  For whatever reason they 
might choose, each author places the lion’s share of blame for the war wholly on 
Trajan’s shoulders.  Such a consensus would seem then to support our broader 
argument that Rome was, in fact, the aggressor, and not simply defending its territory 
from an impending Parthian threat. 
The Fall of the Arsacids 
Despite the Senate’s perpetual adulation, not all Romans favored Trajan’s 
campaigns in the East.  Some critics warned that, by establishing provinces in far off 
Mesopotamia, Trajan had succeeded only in dangerously overextending the effective 
range of the Roman military.  Trajan’s adopted son and successor, Hadrian, seems to 
have shared this opinion, for he soon withdrew completely from Mesopotamia, 
abandoning all provincial claims to the region.  In its weakened state, the Arsacid 
dynasty was unable to recover fully from the sudden power vacuum that this withdrawal 
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created.  Its enemies, which were now quite numerous, continued to harass the 
beleaguered kingdom, detaching from the empire crucial territories such as Bactria.  
During the next century, several Roman emperors, such as Lucius Verus, Septimius 
Severus, and Caracalla, further contributed to this process by mounting their own 
‘Parthian’ expeditions.  We will now examine briefly their campaigns and the collapse of 
the Arsacid state.133  
The ongoing struggle for power in Parthia between Osroes and Vologases II 
continued through much of the remainder of Hadrian’s reign.  During this period, 
Armenia held ostensibly a semi-independent status, after Vologases’ departure from 
that territory following the Roman withdrawal.  However, in 128/29, Osroes was finally 
defeated, clearing the way first for Vologases and then for his successor Vologases IV 
to take the throne.  During the rule of the Roman emperor Antoninus Pius (138-161), 
this Vologases seems to have done little worthy of record, for the classical writers make 
few references to Parthia at this time.  Debevoise suggests that Pius may have even 
used his influence to secure some type of truce in Mesopotamia.  If so, then this would 
explain why Pius’ death in 161 so emboldened Vologases, who quickly dispatched 
troops to Armenia to reestablish Parthian hegemony there.  Had the Parthians stopped 
then at Armenia, there might not have been any immediate Roman reprisal, for the 
empire was in a state of transition.  However, the crushing defeat of the Roman legate 
C. Severianus only further encouraged Vologases’ general Osroes, who wasted no time 
marching his army across the Euphrates into Syria.134   
                                                          
133 The Historia Augusta reports (Hadrian 21.14) that the king of Bactria sent envoys to Hadrian 
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Pius’ successor Marcus Aurelius could not allow such an outrage to go 
unpunished.  He, therefore, sent his co-emperor Lucius Verus to the eastern front with 
the authority to launch a full-scale campaign against Parthia.  In 163, Verus, who 
directed most of this operation safely from Antioch, ordered his general Statius Priscus 
into Armenia.  Priscus’ forces were made up not only of Rome’s various oriental 
contingents, but also of several legions transferred from the Rhine and Danube.  
Vologases’ troops in Armenia proved no match for such a formidable Roman army and 
surrendered Artaxata without much resistance.  Priscus then installed the Roman client-
king Sohaemus on the Armenian throne.135   
A year later, Verus also dispatched another of his generals, Avidius Cassius, to 
Mesopotamia.  After several hard-fought battles, Cassius reached Ctesiphon and 
Seleucia, which he besieged and then razed.  However, unfortunately for the Romans, 
an epidemic soon spread throughout their ranks, killing many and forcing them to 
withdraw.  By 166, the Parthians had apparently retaken much of their lost territory, for 
the Roman appointee in Armenia Sohaemus was driven to exile in Syria.  Although 
Verus launched a brief counter-offensive, which recaptured Edessa and Nisibis, his 
plans to occupy all of Mesopotamia were soon abandoned.136 
Although Verus’ Mesopotamian campaign fell far short of its projected goal, we 
must not view it as a complete Roman disaster.  For while it is indeed true that Verus’ 
legions suffered terrible losses, we must not forget too that Parthia’s armies were also 
greatly depleted.  Yes, of course, Vologases narrowly managed to retain his throne, but 
at what cost?  After 166, Parthia would never again hold territory west of the Khabur 
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River, and cities such as Edessa, Nisibis, and Carrhae would fall even more under 
Roman influence.  Verus’ war, although fleeting, marks a crucial step in the decline of 
Arsacid Parthia.137 
Parthia’s troubles were further compounded by the poor decisions of its next 
ruler, Vologases V, who had usurped his namesake’s throne in 191.  Two years later, 
when Marcus Aurelius’ son and heir Commodus was assassinated, Vologases chose, 
along with several of Rome’s eastern vassals, to back Pescennius Niger of Syria in his 
contention for the emperorship.  This decision proved to be disastrous for Parthia, for 
Niger was soon defeated by the African Septimius Severus, who wasted no time 
mounting a punitive expedition against the ‘treasonous’ Vologases.  By 196, Severus 
had captured much of northern Mesopotamia and was poised for an attack on Parthia 
itself, when news arrived of a widespread revolt in Gaul.  He, therefore, garrisoned 
Nisibis and return westwards to deal with the rebelling province.138         
In 197, Severus returned to Mesopotamia with three newly-formed legions: the I, 
II, and III Parthica.  He relieved Nisibis’ commander Laetus, who had won great fame 
among the soldiers after repelling several Parthian assaults against the city.  During 
Severus’ absence in Gaul, the Parthians had seized much of the surrounding territory 
and may have even, if we are to believe Herodian, retaken Armenia.  However, 
whatever boldness Vologases had found was soon lost upon Severus’ return, for the 
Parthians quickly dispersed before the Romans’ advance.  Perhaps in imitation of 
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Trajan’s campaign, Severus had his armies construct a fleet of swift boats, which they 
then used to navigate down the Euphrates, capturing Seleucia and Babylon.139   
Dio reports that Severus next unleashed his troops on Ctesiphon solely for the 
purpose of plundering the capital.  Severus, who it seems had no intention of 
establishing a permanent Roman presence in Mesopotamia, did not even bother to 
pursue Vologases, who had fled prior to the Romans’ arrival.  Instead, with much of 
Ctesiphon ablaze, he ordered a general withdrawal, leaving Parthia’s great cities in ruin.  
But before leaving, Severus also tried to besiege Hatra, perhaps hoping to succeed 
where Trajan had failed.  Like Trajan, however, Severus was unable to force the city 
into submission and succeeded only in losing many men and supplies.140 
But much like Verus’ campaign, Severus’ expedition can be viewed as a success 
in a roundabout way.  It is, of course, true that the Romans failed to capture Vologases 
or even to acquire any new territory; but, as we have seen, this was most probably not 
their intention.  Rather, Severus sought to punish the Parthians for their ill placed faith in 
Niger.  It is, in these regards, that Severus most surely succeeded, for any political or 
economic ground Vologases had regained during his reign was once again lost.  
Parthia’s capital was wrecked; much of its population either slaughtered or enslaved.  
And with its infrastructure in shambles, many of the kingdom’s vassals took the 
opportunity to assert their independence. 
In ca. 207/8, Abgarus IX of Osrhoene broke from his Parthian vassalage and 
began expanding his kingdom’s territory.  However, his bid for independence was ill 
conceived, for he mistakenly assumed that Parthia, rather than Rome, was still his 
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immediate sovereign in the region.  When he appeared before Rome’s new emperor 
Caracalla to discuss their countries’ mutual affairs, he was seized and imprisoned.  
Thus, Caracalla brought Osrhoene completely under Roman sway, further paring down 
Parthia’s once-great empire.  When Khusrau I, the king of Armenia, tried similarly to 
affirm his state’s independent status, Caracalla used the same ruse to capture that 
kingdom’s royal family.  Unlike Osrhoene, however, the Armenians did not submit, 
forcing the emperor to dispatch his general Theocritus.  Yet the Armenians, perhaps 
more inspired than demoralized by the loss of their beloved king, proved too much for 
the Romans, who were sorely defeated.141     
Meanwhile, in Parthia, Vologases was succeeded by his son, the sixth of the 
same name.  Yet a rift soon developed between Parthia’s new king and his brother, 
Artabanus V, the ruler of Media.  This fraternal dispute was soon brought to the 
attention of Caracalla, who needed just such an opportunity to redeem himself after the 
debacle in Armenia.  As Parthia prepared for another prolonged civil conflict, Caracalla 
sent a message to Media’s capital Ecbatana, demanding that Artabanus’ daughter be 
given to him in marriage.  Dio reports that this supposed attempt at an alliance was 
merely intended as a pretext for war, which was quickly demonstrated by the fact that 
Caracalla soon began ravaging portions of northern Mesopotamia.  Herodian’s version 
of events, although less plausible, is certainly more dramatic, for he records an episode 
in which Caracalla’s proposal is at first accepted.  The emperor’s entourage then travels 
to Artabanus’ court where they partake in an elaborate wedding feast.  However, during 
this celebration, the Romans ambush the Parthian guests, who are of course too 
inebriated to defend themselves.  But while Herodian’s story is most probably fictitious, 
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it is likely that Caracalla spent some time laying waste to Media and its surrounding 
territory until his assassination in 217.  Coins from this period, baring the inscription 
VIC(TORIA) PART(HICA), seem to corroborate such events.142 
Caracalla’s expedition into Mesopotamia marks the last Roman invasion of 
Arsacid Parthia.  By 220, the kingdom’s long history of civil strife and repeated foreign 
occupation had taken its toll.  Many of the Arsacid dynasty’s vassals no longer had 
confidence enough in Vologases or Artabanus to warrant their continued support.  A 
movement for new leadership, initiated by Ardashir of Persis, soon arose which grew 
rapidly among Parthia’s disgruntled nobility.  In 222/23, Ardashir’s coalition defeated 
Vologases and took control of Seleucia and Ctesiphon.  Five years later, Artabanus was 
also slain, making Ardashir the sole ruler of all Parthia.143   
The Sassanid dynasty, which Ardashir founded, proved to be a much more 
formidable opponent for Rome.  In the years to come, Ardashir and his son Shapur I 
reconquered nearly all of Mesopotamia.  In 258/59, Shapur even managed to capture 
the Roman emperor Valerian in battle near Edessa.  At Naqsh-i Rustam and Bishapur, 
this scene is depicted by carvings which show the subjugated Valerian kneeling before 
his conqueror.  Although the Armenian evidence is sparse concerning this period, 
Moses of Khorene records an episode in which the Sassanid ruler, who was most 
probably Shapur, orchestrates the assassination of Armenia’s king.  A Sassanid was 
then placed briefly on that kingdom’s throne.  And we can further assume, from the 
continual pressure that Shapur and his successors place on the Roman provinces of 
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Syria and Asia Minor, that Rome had little time and few resources necessary to concern 
itself any longer with such remote territories, as Armenia.144 
Conclusion 
There is much speculation about why Trajan invaded Mesopotamia.  As Guey 
suggests, perhaps he sought viable trade routes to the Far East; or as Dio Cassius 
asserts, perhaps he intended only to win fame and glory for himself.  In any case, no 
historian, either classical or modern, blames Parthia’s king Osroes specifically for 
inciting this round of conflict.  Thus Trajan’s Parthian war can be seen as just another 
instance of unjustifiable Roman imperialism. 
But it can also be viewed as the culmination of nearly two centuries of political 
posturing and military rivalry.  Ever since Crassus’ defeat at Carrhae, Rome’s generals 
and emperors had dreamt of reining in Parthia.  Because of the ever-growing fear at 
Rome of the impending Parthian threat, no other act could win for them such renown.  
Their constant interference in Parthia’s internal politics crippled the kingdom’s 
infrastructure, weakening the resolve of its military and undermining the authority of its 
ruling dynasty.  By Trajan’s era, the Parthian state had already endured countless civil 
disputes and barbarian raids, such as those of the Alani.  Thus the kingdom was ripe for 
the taking. 
Furthermore, Armenia’s part in these Roman conquests should now be clearer, 
for nearly all of Rome’s campaigns into Mesopotamia began with the subjugation of that 
territory.  Pompey, Crassus, and Antony each occupied it before proceeding with their 
respective expeditions.  The Julio-Claudian emperors all conspired to have client-kings 
placed on its throne.  And Trajan, who immediately recognized its strategic importance, 
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even attempted to provincialize it.  Armenia was the gateway to the riches of the 
Parthian kingdom; and it therefore became the staging ground for Roman leaders who 
sought to win triumphs for themselves in the region.    
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Epilogue 
 
 The Emperor Marcus Aurelius laments in his Meditations, “Time is a violent 
torrent; no sooner is a thing brought to sight than it is swept by and another takes its 
place.”145  His insight fittingly describes not only Armenia’s unstable political situation 
during the first two centuries AD, but that of the entire Near Eastern world at this time.  
Thus, the rise of the Iranian Sassanids ushered in yet a new era for both Rome and 
Armenia, although not how we might assume.  For although the Arsacids had been 
ousted from Mesopotamia, they continued to rule in Armenia until the mid-fifth century, 
winning for that kingdom an autonomy unknown since the reign of Tigranes the Great.  
The success of the Arsacids in Armenia only further supports our thesis, for it suggests 
that they were not inherently bad rulers.  Their poor performance as Parthia’s kings 
stemmed not from any innate lack of ability, but from the constant interference of Rome. 
 Yet Aurelius’ portent would eventually be as true for Rome as it was for the Near 
East, for the Empire would not weather the third century well.  Besides the looming 
Sassanid threat, Rome’s emperors also had to deal with barbarian invasions, rampant 
inflation, and incessant plots against the throne.  All things more characteristic of the 
Parthian state only a century earlier.  The Roman psyche, its predilection for one-
upmanship, had indeed won the Empire a venerable place in history.  But that same 
psyche, inundated by paranoia and greed, would also be the cause of Rome’s undoing.  
Armenia, Parthia, and the rest of the Near Eastern world were but casualties of the 
Roman Empire’s stellar rise and fall.            
                                                          
145 M. Aur. Med. bk. 4, sect. 43. 
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Appendix 1: List of Rulers 
 
Armenian Kings 
The Artaxiad Dynasty:    
 
Artaxias I   190-159  Founded first Armenian dynasty 
Tigranes I   159-123      
Artavasdes I   123-95   
Tigranes II the Great 95-55   Rules Armenia’s only empire in  
the ancient world; Defeated by Lucullus 
and Pompey but allowed to retain his 
throne    
Artavasdes II   55-34   Tigranes’ son; acts as advisor for  
both Crassus and Antony 
Artaxias II   33-20     
Tigranes III   20-10    
Tigranes IV and Erato 10-5 and 4-1  Pro-Parthian leanings lead to  
their brief deposition under Augustus but 
reinstated by Parthian king Phraataces 
Artavasdes III  5-4   Rules during Tigranes’ absence 
Ariobarzanes   3-1   Installed by Augustus’ general  
Gaius; rules in contest with Tigranes 
 
Non-Artaxiad or Arsacid kings: 
 
Artavasdes III (reign cont.) 1 BC-AD 12/13 Ariobarzanes’ son; Ruled  
previously during Tigranes’ deposition; 
reassumes throne after his father death 
Vonones   12/13?-13/14? Son of Parthian king Phraates IV;  
Becomes Armenian king after being 
ousted from Parthian throne 
Orodes I   14/15?-18 
Artaxias III   18-32   Installed by Tiberius’ general  
Germanicus; rules during period of 
Romano-Parthian détente 
Arsaces I   32-35?  Son of Parthian king Artabanus  
III; his installation provokes yet another 
round of Roman interference in Parthia’s 
internal politics 
Mithridates   35?-52  Brother of Iberian king  
Pharasmanes; assumes throne with 
Rome’s consent 
Rhadamistus   52 
  81
Tiridates I   53-60   Brother of Parthian king  
Vologases I; first installed as king during 
Vologases’ invasion of Armenia 
Tigranes V   60-62   Appointed as king by Nero after  
Corbulo’s successful campaign against 
the Parthians; but eventually ousted 
after Paetus’ defeat at Rhandeia 
 
The Arsacid Dynasty: 
 
Tiridates I (reign cont.) 62-75   Crowned by Nero at Rome; first  
instance of Rome approving a Parthian 
candidate for the Armenian throne  
Sanatruk   75-110 
Axidares   110-113  Nephew of Parthian king Osroes;  
his installation served as Trajan’s 
excuse to campaign against Parthia 
Parthamasiris  113-114  Brother of Axidares; murdered by  
Trajan 
Parthamaspates  116-117  Son of Parthian king Osroes;  
betrayed his father and allied with 
Trajan to defeat Parthian rebels in 
Mesopotamia 
Valarsh   117-140  
Aurelius Pacorus  161-163 
Valarsh II   180-91 
Khusrau I   191-217  Captured by Caracalla 
Tiridates II   217-52   
 
Note: Although outside the scope of this project, Arsacid kings continued to rule in 
Armenia until the mid-fifth century.  Their rule was finally abolished in AD 438 due to 
pressure from the Iranian Sassanids.    
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Parthian Kings 
Arsaces  ca. 250-248  Orodes III  4-ca. 6/7 
Tiridates I  ca. 248-211  Vonones I  7/8-12 
Artabanus I  ca. 211-191  Artabanus III  12-ca. 38 
Priapatius  ca. 191-176  Tiridates III  ca. 36 
Phraates I  ca. 176-171  Gotarzes II  ca. 38-51 
Mithridates I  ca. 171-138/37 Vardanes  ca. 39-47/48 
Phraates II  138/37-ca. 128 Vonones II  ca. 51 
Artabanus II  ca. 128-124/23 Vologases I  51/52-79/80 
Mithridates II   ca. 123-88/87 Vologases II  77-80 
Gotarzes I  91-81/80  Pacorus II  78-115/16 
Orodes I  80-76/75  Artabanus IV  80-81 
Sinatruces  76/75-70 or 69 Osroes  ca. 109/10-128/29 
Phraates III  70 or 69-58/57 Parthamaspates ca. 117 
Mithridates III 58/57-55  Vologases III  105/6-147 
Orodes II  ca. 57-37/36  Mithridates IV 128/29-147 
Pacorus I  died in 38  Vologases IV  148-192 
Phraates IV  ca. 38-2  Vologases V  191-207/8 
Tiridates II  ca. 30-25  Vologases VI  207/8-222/23 
Phraataces (Phraates V)   Artabanus V  ca. 213-227 
   2 BC-AD 4  Artavasdes  ca. 227-228/29 
 
 
Roman Emperors 
 
Augustus  27 BC-AD 14  Trajan   98-117 
Tiberius  14-37   Hadrian  117-138 
Caligula  37-41   Antonius Pius 138-161 
Claudius  41-54   Marcus Aurelius 161-180 
Nero   54-68   Lucius Verus  161-169 
Galba, Otho, Vitellius   Commodus  180-192 
   68-69   Julianus and Pertinax 
Vespasian  69-79      193 
Titus   79-81   Septimius Severus 193-211 
Domitian  81-96   Caracalla  211-217 
Nerva   96-98 
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